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SO8 I 
Peace-or the End of Civilization 
SWIFT MOVING world developments have taken place since 
this pamphlet was completed. 
We are face to face with hideous weapons of limitless and uncon- 
trollable power in the new hydrogen bombs that today can destroy 
a city like New York, a whole country-and tomorrow the world! 
We have heard our Secretary of State say that under the instant 
massive retaliation policy the President alone could make the deci- 
sion, without consulting Congress or America's allies, to unleash 
this monstrous power. 
We have been informed of our government's intention to keep 
the war in IndoChina going at all costs, continuing a needless 
bloody struggle that could spread to world-wide proportions, and 
bring the H-bomb into use. 
In the face of these new and terrible dangers, the Soviet Union 
has given a striking new demonstration of its will to peace in an 
offer to carry further the proposals made at the Berlin Conference 
for a collective security system in Europe which would eliminate 
the dangers of new aggression arising from a rearmed Western 
Germany. This new proposal was made in a note handed by Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov to the United States, Great Britain and 
France on March 31. 
Citing the growing destructiveness of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons, Mr. Molotov renewed the appeal of his government for 
agreement on their prohibition. The use of such weapons, he said, 
"would mean the wholesale annihilation of civilians and the de- 
struction of big cities, the centers of present-day industry, culture 
and science, including such old centers of civilization as the leading 
capitals of the world." 
Mr. Molotov renewed the Soviet proposal made at the Berlin 
Conference for an all-European collective security treaty, Meet- 
ing the objections that it would be undesirable to have the United 
States remain outside as originally contemplated, he said the Soviet 
Government now sees no obstacle to the United States participating 
in such a treaty. 
At the same time, while reiterating the dangers of a revived 
German militarism under the European Defense Community, the 
note stated that, along with the establishment of an all-European 
collective security system, the USSR is ready to examine the 
question of its own participation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
under conditions insuring its truly defensive character. 
In spite of our State Department's swift rejecion of this new 
offer, it  cannot but make the strongest impression on the peoples 
of Europe, of our own country, and the world. 
When the only alternative is the road leading to the end of 
civilization, dare we close the way to peace? 
NEGOTIATIONS: The Way to Peace 
The  Berlin Conference 
a n d  After 
THE GREAT and positive significance of the Berlin Four- 
Power Foreign Ministers' Conference was in re-establishing the 
principle of negotiations as the only way to settle disputes among 
nations and lead the world toward peace. 
The very fact that the conference was held despite the long and 
determined efforts to prevent it marked a great victory for the peace 
forces of the world. 
And it can be counted an even greater victory that out of this 
conference came the decision for the Geneva conference with the 
participation of the Chinese People's Republic, on the questions of 
a peace settlement for Korea and of restoring peace in Indochina. 
The Big Four agreement to hold an exchange of views on dis- 
armament, even on a limited basis, opens the way to new discussions 
on reducing the terrible and wasteful burden of the armaments 
and atomic race, under which ever more fiendish weapons are being 
developed. 
Although it is a serious matter that no agreement could be 
reached on the peaceful unification of Germany, problems of Euro- 
pean security and the Austrian treaty, many issues were clarified in 
the debates on these subjects, 
The conference raised sharply the grave dangers to peace of a 
policy which not only keeps Germany divided, but would turn all 
Europe into two opposing armed camps as the inevitable result of 
the establishment of the European Defense Community* and the 
remilitarization of Germany. The Soviet proposal for a fifty-year 
collective security pact for all European countries focussed atten- 
tion on an alternative plan under which all the countries of Europe, 
regardless of differing social systems, could co-exist peacefully. 
What is of the deepest concern to the American people is the 
role of our own government at the conference, because every ques- 
+See Glossary, page 61, for explanation of mG zu$ ,other organizations 
and !treaties referred to in text. WTI I 
tion di-d in Berlin hm a direct bearing on our own lives. 
Scaetary Dulles made absolutely clear both before and during 
the conference that he was not prepared to negotiate about the 
one thing on which a peaceful settlement for Germany and Europe 
depends-the question of rearmifig Germany through the EDC, 
and on th is  he carried along the French and British Foreign Minis- 
ters, with whom every step was coordinated in advance. 
The Eden proposal for holding all-German elections under the 
control of the four powea and their troops, and on terms which 
would commit a united Germany in advance to a military alliance 
with the West was, in fact, the only proposal on ~ e r m a n ~  by the 
three Western countries. It held no answer to the main problem 
of preventing renewed German aggression. 
The policy of reviving German militarism, the continuation of 
the arms drive and all the other aspects of the cold war and war 
preparations which are already having such a disastrous effect on 
American life, is no more in the interests of our country than of 
the people of Europe. Our country has not known the devasta- 
tion and horror of invasion of our own soil, but thousands of 
American youth have died as a result of aggressive German militar- 
ism in two world wars. A third world war, fought with atomic and 
hydrogen weapons of frightful power, would bring the devastation 
we have not known before to America itself, to all our people, on 
a scale never before dreamed of. 
The voices of the peace forces of America, of all the people 
who want to spare our country and the world such horrors, were 
not heard at Berlin. The voices of the trade unions, awakening at 
last to what the cold war policies mean to them as unemployment 
and living costs soar, were not heard. The voices of millions of 
ordinary 'krnericans, Negro and white, wanting to lead normal, 
decent lives in an America true to its democratic traditions, were 
not heard. 
It was not that America, the real America, that Mr. Dulles was 
representing when on the eve of the conference he unveiled the 
"new look" military policy threatening instant massive atomic 
retaliation against the cities of the Soviet Union and China if some 
local conflict might break out which the Administration chose to 
interpret as "Communist aggression." 
From many quarters, questions are being raised here at home 
and among America's allies as to the dreadful implications of this 
policy, which would put in the hands of one man the power to 
wipe out tens of millions of human lives. A great national discus- 
sion has arisen around this issue. 
The Berlin Conference has already made its contribution to 
that discussion. It has brought home more clearly than ever that 
there is no threat of aggression from the Soviet Union or China, 
whose leaders are doing everying in their power to substitute the 
conference table for force and threats of force in world affairs. 
I 
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A whole series of military moves during the conference indi- 
I cated that the United States, on the contrary, was placing continued 
I ' 
I 
reliance on armed force rather than negotiations. 
The first U.S. unit of B-47 atomic jet bombers was sent to 
I 
' 2  Moroccan bases from which, newspapers reported, "potential tar- 
I gets in European Russia and the Black Sea oil region are brought 
into range." Preparations were advanced for the building of air 
bases in Franco Spain. The United States-Pakistan military alli- 
ance and the related Turkey-Pakistan Pact, both bitterly opposed 
by India and other Asian countries, were announced, as links in a 
chain of Middle Eastern bases against the Soviet Union. Additional ' U.S. Air Force personnel were sent to IndoChina, and plans re- 
ported to spend another $ i ,2oo,ooo,ooo of the American tax-payer's 
money to keep the war in Indochina going, instead of ending it. 
Since the conference, the American- Japanese military assistance 
pact has been signed, carrying further the plans for the rearming of 
Japan as a new base for aggression in the Far East. 
Mr. Dulles, on his return from Berlin, was met with a barrage 
of criticism from the China Lobby camp for having agreed to a 
conference with People's China. After being grilled by members 
) ' of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State 
' objected bitterly that he should not be subjected to such qiticism, 
since "we won every point from the Russians in Berlin." 
As to winning every point from the Russians, it is interesting to 
note that the only question on which agreement was reached, the 
Soviet proposal for a conference including the Chinese People's 
Republic, was one which Secretary Dulles had fought desperately 
to exclude altogether. Secretary Dulles was compelled to yield on 
this point under pressure from M. Bidault who knew that his gov- 
ernment's only hope for survival lay in making some gesture toward 
ending the hated war in Indochina. 
We cannot agree with Mr. Dulles' conclusion that he had 
achieved his main purpose and that Berlin "cleared the way" for 
pushing ahead with E X .  
We believe ratification of EDC will be more, not less difficult, 
as a result of the peaceful alternative offered by the USSR. 
Opposition to EM: among the French people and in parliament 
has intensified as a result of the conference, and is strong in all 
political parties from right to left. 
In England both the Executive and the Parliamentary groups 
of the Labor Party are split sharply on the issue of EDC, while rank 
and file opposition has grown steadily in vigor. 
Rime Minister Churchill, in a speech in the House of Commons 
Fcbruay 25, while supporting EDC, indicated that the Berlin Con- 
ference had made "discussion of all these questions less delicate 
and dangerous than it was before." He welcomed the Geneva meet- 
ing with People's China, and declared that he still favored a top 
level meeting of heads of governments. 
Sir Winston made a strong plea for more trade with the USSR 
and the People's Democracies: 
"The more the two great divisions in the world mingle in 
the healthy and fruitful activities of commerce, the greater the 
counterpoise! to the purely military calculations." 
The question of East-West trade has become of paramount im- 
portance in both France and England. This was emphasized during 
the conference when the announcement was made of the Moscow 
offer of over a billion dollars worth of contracts to a visiting delega- 
tion of British businessmen. Demands for the lifting of U.S. embar. 
goes which are cutting Britain off from lucrative orders from China, 
the USSR and the People's Democracies are being made by influ- 
ential business and official circles in England, who are feeling the 
pressure of the competition of the American-fostered industry of 
Germany and Japan. 
In Italy, too, opposition to EDC is growing, both popular and 
parliamentary. 
In Western Germany, millions of trade unionists and peace 
supporters have joined the people of Eastern Germany in opposing 
EDC and calling for peaceful unification. On February 25 Chancel- 
lor Adenauer rushed through the Bundestag a constitutional amend- 
ment permitting rearmament and conscription to speed the process 
of ratification of E X .  But the measure was vigorously opposed 
by the large German Social Democratic Party. 
It is necessary that the utmost vigilance be exerted to insure 
that the promising beginnings of a new course in foreign relations 
opened up by the Berlin Conference be followed through. Already 
there are strong efforts to destroy its positive results, using it as a 
pretext for new war preparations. 
A favorite remark of the antiSoviet commentators since the 
conference has been that it proved that "after all, nothing has 
changed since the death of Stalin," meaning that those people who 
have taken seriously the Soviet peace moves during the past year 
are now demonstrated to have been mistaken. 
The basic peace policy of the Soviet Union has indeed not 
changed since the death of Stalin. The struggle for negotiations. 
for peaceful co-existence has been carried on since the birth of the 
Soviet Union, first by Lenin and then by Stalin. This struggle 
reached a higher stage than ever during the past year because the 
dangers of new war have intensified, and because the growing 
de~tructiveness of atomic and hydrogen weapons has made it more 
vital than ever to avoid war. 
The position of the Soviet Union at the Berlin Conference con- 
firms the statement that has been made so frequently by Soviet 
Premier Malenkov that there are no international problems that 
cannot be solved if the will to solve them is present. In a speech on 
March In, Malenkov called again for peaceful economic competition 
between the USSR and the capitalist countries, instead of cold war, 
warning against "a new world war that, with modern weapons, 
would mean the destruction of civilization." 
The American people are fundamentally wholesome and sen- 
sible, and they certainly do not want war. They can be counted on 
to act correctly if they know the truth. But the withering barrage 
of propaganda poured out in the post-war years about the myth 
of Soviet aggression has poisoned the minds of many. 
What Americans must understand is that the myth of threatened 
Soviet aggression is not accepted by the masses of the people any- 
where else in the world. American military leaders and official 
spokesmen have themselves had to acknowledge there is no danger 
of attack from the Soviet Union. 
In order to keep alive the hysteria and fear on which the arms 
and atomic program and the ever-increasing chain of worldwide 
military bases is sold to the people, the hoax was devised of an 
"international Communist conspiracy," supposedly directed by the 
Soviet Union to carry out its purposes by "indirect" aggression. 
By a monstrous perversion, the socialist ideals which have ani- 
mated the finest and most humane people all over the world for 
more than a century, long before there was a Soviet Union, and 
under which a third of the world's people are living today, have 
been equated with everything that is evil and vicious, and those 
who hold such ideas declared to be agents or dupes of the Soviet 
Union. This alleged conspiracy is extended to include all people's 
liberation movements, movements for land reform, for higher living 
standards, for racial equality, decent education and housing and 
working conditions and other needs of common concern to working 
people everywhere. 
At the Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Secretary Dullcs' 
main effort was concentrated on pushing through a resolution &- 
signed to bind all the Latin American countries to take action 
together against the "Intervention of International Communism 
in the American Republics." Mr. Dulles defined " in terna t id  
communism" as that "far flung clandestine politid organization 
which ia operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of t+c 
Soviet Union." Thus he sought to pave the way for United States 
intenention in the republic of Guatemala on the ground that dem- 
ocratic reforms there introduced have been the result of this "con- 
spiracy"; or in any future effort of any of the people of Latin 
America to replace a military dictatorship by a democratic regime 
which would then be cited as a case of "indirect Soviet aggression." 
The resolution, passed under pressure, has caused deep resentment 
among the peoples of Latin America, whose main interest is in 
constructive economic aid from the United States, and the end of 
colonialism. I t  was hardly constr~ct~ive preparation for the next 
round of negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
While anti-communism in our foreign relations has been turned 
against all people's liberation movements, here at home we have 
seen it boomerang against those who set it in motion. 
It is not coknmunism, not the socialist countries that are threat- 
ening the h e r i c a n  way of life, but anti-communism, with its book 
burning, thought control, racism, police state and fascist methods. 
The last war, unleashed by the fascist states under the banner of 
anti-communism and turned against all the democracies, showed 
where anti-communism leads. It is time for the American peo- 
ple to understand this, to learn that the socialist world is here to 
stay, that it offers no threat, and that our future security requires 
a policy of peaceful co-existence under which the people of all 
nations may develop the way of life they choose. 
I t  is necessary for us to understand the real facts about life in 
the Soviet Union and China and the People's Democracies, because 
these facts show that their programs for improving the living stand- 
ards, the material and cultural well-being of their people, depend 
on peace for their fulfillment. 
The proceedings of the Berlin conference and the Soviet pro- 
posals there made, afEord an opportunity to study Soviet foreign 
policy in action, and to judge for ourselves where areas of agree- 
ment may be found. 
The American people have not had access to adequate accounts 
of the proposals and discussions at Berlin. Press reports on the 
Soviet proposals were limited and biased. Correspondents in Berlin 
did not attend the sessions, but had to be content with copies of 
the main speeches and briefings from each delegation. Of US. 
briefings, M. S. Handler reported in the New York Times for Janu- 
ary 96 : "Correspondents complained that the American officials 
had employed psychological warfare tactics rather than having pro- 
vided objective analysis and appraisal of Mr. Molotov's statement." 
Yet the proceedings of the conference, the proposals and dis- 
cussions have a vital importance for all Americans. They affect the 
security and well-being of our country, the futur; of our children, 
the peace of the world. I 
That is why New World Review is attempting to help fill the 
gap with this pamphlet. 
I t  is important that Americans know what proposals were made 
by the USSR and the flexibility shown by Mr. Molotov in the dis- 
cussions, so that we may understand that they offer' a basis for con- 
tinuing negotiations on a peaceful settlement for Europe, for the 
Far East, on questions of disarmament and of East-West trade. 
The restoration of peace in IndoChina would end eight years 
of agony and useless bloodshed forced upon a people fighting for 
their independence, the needless losses to France, the dangers of 
direct American involvement. 
Reduction of armaments, the banning of atomic and hydrogen 
weapons, will lift a great weight of fear and dangm from the people 
of America and the world, and make it possible to turn our e W s  
and our resources to the building of hospitals, roads, schools, homes, 
flood control, soil reclamation, hydroelectric and other public works 
for the people's welfare. 
The opening of East-West trade is the best way to avoid the 
oncoming depression. The vast markets of the Soviet Union, Peo- 
ple's China and the Eastern European Democracies offer millions 
of jobs to solve the swiftly growing unemployment problem. 
The opening of East-West social, sport and cultural relations 
is the best way of enriching the life of the people of all countries 
and establishing the bonds of human brotherhood. 
We believe that these are the things the American people want 
and that it is possible to achieve them. I t  was the people's longing 
for an end of the bloodshed that brought about the armistice in 
Korea; their weariness with war preparations that brought about 
the negotiations in Berlin. 
It was the people's indignation that started the movement to 
puncture the paver of McCarthy. That indignation must now be 
directed against the whole war policy that nurtured him, and 
which under the false banner of "anti-co~munism" has been 
undermining the very foundations of American democracy. 
The ending of the cold war is the best way to end the McCarthy- 
ism and McCarranism that are its products, and all the aspects of 
the growing fascist menace that is destroying our American way of 
life under the monstrous pretense of preserving it. 
Now let us make sure that the promises of Berlin and Geneva 
are fulfilled. This means that the people must take a hand in 
steering our foreign policy firmly on the course of continuing nego- 
tiations so that our country shall regain its falling prestige and 
once again play an honorable and peaceful role in the world. 
The Four Powers Meet 
THE HOPES of the world were centered on the Four-Power 
negotiations as the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the So- 
viet Union, Great Britain and France, with their delegations, con- 
verged on Berlin f o r  the opening session of January nij, ,their first 
meeting since 1949. 
The pattern of prior consultations among the three Western 
Powers was continued on the eve of the conference, and during the 
conference itself. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conferred 
with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and French Foreign 
Minister George Bidault before meeting with Soviet Foreign Minis- 
ter Viacheslav Molotov. While it was reported that the three had 
agreed in advance "to resist any attempts to turn it into a Big 5 
Conference with China present" (New York Herald Tribune, Janu- 
ary n4), there was in fact a fifth partner in the deliberations. M. S. 
Handler reported in the New York Times, January 25: 
"Dr. Blankenhorn, one of Dr. Adenauer's most trusted 
advisas on foreign affairs, and the eleven officers of the special 
West German mlssion in Berlin, hold a most important assign- 
ment: to make certain that there is no deviation at the confer- 
ence from the agreed program for the reunification of Germany 
devised by Chancellor Adenauer and accepted publicly by the 
United States and Britain." 
Dr. Blankenhorn, incidentally, is a former Nazi Party member 
with a long record in Hitler's foreign service, as indeed, have the 
majority of those who hold executive posts in Adenauer's foreign 
ministry. 
In accordance with reported plans for M. Bidault to take the 
initiative and for Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden to play "supporting 
roles," it fell to the French Foreign Minister to open the conference. 
And thus it was that the spokesman of France, where there is the 
greatest resistance in Europe to the rearming of Germany, was given 
the role of insisting on German rearmament and the European 
Defense Community as a prior condition to any agreement. H e  
declared, "For the progress of our work here it is essential that it 
shall be understood from the beginning that our defense effort 
cannot be the object of negotiation." "Defense effort" is the 
euphemism generally employed by the West to describe the revival 
of the Wehrmacht under EDC. 
M. Bidault, of course, was not speaking for the people of France, 
for the French parliament, nor indeed for any French Govern- 
ment which could hope to stay in power if it supported EDC. 
In fact, he was not even speaking for the French delegation. 
Michael Hofhnan reported in the New Ymk Times, January 28: 
"According to one diplomatic source in an excellent position 
to know, a art from M. Bidault, there is only one man in the P French de egation who fully supports the idea of bringing 
Germany into the European Community. He is M. Francob 
Poncet. M. Parodi, M. Bidault's top assistant, is firmly and out- 
spokenly opposed to the defense community." 
Mr. Eden started out by saying that the failure of h o p  to 
carry out the partnership of the war years had been the main reason 
for bringing into existence the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion and the plans for EDC. He insisted that the agreements made 
were purely defensive, that Her Majesty's Government was loyal 
both to the United Nations and its treaty with the Soviet Union, 
and would never be party to any aggression or threaten the secur- 
ity of the Soviet Union. He said that an all-German Government 
set up on the basis of free elections must be the first step and that 
"the all-German Government should be free to assume any inter- 
national rights and obligations of either regime," thus emphasiz- 
ing the agreed-upon Western attitude that a united Germany must 
be associated militarily with the West. 
Mr. Molotov in his opening remarks, emphasized that the ques- 
tion of Germany could not be examined apart from the general 
question of security in Europe. 
He noted that Germany had borne the main responsibility for 
unleashing two world wan, and the immeasurable sacrifices suf- 
fered by the people of Europe in World War 11. Therefore the 
chief task before the conference was to settle the German question 
"in a way that would preclude the possibility of new attempts by 
German militarism to precipitate a Third World War.." 
During and after World War I1 the governments of the four 
powers present had held common views on this question, an- 
bodied in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, supported by France 
and all the other united nations. Molotov quoted the Yalta de- 
cision: 
"It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism 
and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be 
able to destroy the peace of the world." 
I I 
Thus, the basic question being whether a unified Germany will 
become a peaceful, democratic state or a militaristic, aggressive one, 
he said it is impermissible that Germany should be drawn into a 
grouping such as the European Defense Community, a military bloc 
of one group of European countries directed against another Euro- 
pean group. He showed from historical examples that it is a mere 
illusion to think that a revived German militarism could be 
kept within the limits of the original plans for the establishment 
of a European army. 
Mr. Molotov declared that the whole question of security in 
Ewope was abound up with the cardinal task of our times-the re- 
laxation of tension in international relations. This required the 
co'mbined efforts of all the Great Powers, and a Five-Power Con- 
ference with the participation of the Chinese People's Republic 
had long been a pressing matter. 
The UN Charter had recognized this in requiring unanimity 
of the Five Great Powers in important decisions of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of peace. This requirement could not 
be complied with while the lawful representatives of the Chinese 
people are outside the United Nations. 
The questions to be considered by such a Five-Power Confer- 
ence, Molotov felt, should include disarmament, the legitimate 
rights of China in the United Nations which in turn would help 
in the solution of other problems, as well as its recognition by 
other powers, a peace settlement for Korea, and the establishment 
of normal conditions for international trade, all of which would 
help in easing international tensions. 
He declared that today it is the armaments race which above all 
creates an unbearable burden for the peoples and cannot but ag- 
gravate international relations, since increased armaments on one 
side must inevitably lead to corresponding action on the other. 
This also pertained to the question of military bases which, when 
established far from a country's frontiers, could have nothing to do 
with defense. He noted: 
"There are uite a number of statements by military and 
non-military lea 8 ers of the United States who declare outright 
that the establishment of American military bases on foreign 
territory is directed against the Soviet Union, against the Peo 
ple's Republic of China, against the People's Democracies." 
He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken toward a substan- 
tial reduction of armaments, especially of the Great Powers, and 
that the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass de- 
struction be renounced, as a step toward complete prohibition of 
mch weapons, and the establishment of international d n m l  to in- 
a m  against violations. 
The Soviet Foreign Minister declared that one of the major 
difficulties in convoking the political conference on Korea was the 
absence of normal relations between some of the Great Powers, due 
to refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China, although 
" 'non-recognition' of facts, and moreover 'nun-recognition' of ma- 
jor historical events, has never yielded positive results." 
Mr. Molotov pointed out that 25 countries have established 
or are in process of establishing diplomatic relations with People's 
China, that India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma have long had 
such relations, and that Premier Nehru of India had stated recently: 
"The United Nations weakens its position by refusing to 
admit Communist China. The emergence of the new China is 
! a tremendous factor in the international situation. Not to rec- ognize China means to shut one's eyes to reality." 
Mr. Molotov noted that many European countries, including At- 
lantic bloc states, had also recognized the necessity of establishing 
diplomatic relations with the New China, and that only on the 
#. - territory of North and South America not a single state had done so. 
Making a strong plea for improvement of trade relations, Mr. 
' Molotov showed that the restrictions imposed by the United States 
on trade with the USSR, China and the People's Democracies had 
not achieved their purpose of checking economic progress in these 
countries, but on the contrary had promoted it. 
Mr. Molotov declared that the Austrian question, too, must 
be considered, in the interests of strengthening peace in Europe 
and restoring Austria's national independence, bearing in mind 
that the settlement must be on a basis which would prevent Austria 
from ever again becoming the tool of aggressive forces. 
The Soviet Foreign Minister then proposed the following three 
points for the conference agenda: 
"1. Measures for lessening the tension in international relations 
and convocation of a conference of the Foreign Ministers 
of France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China. 
''2. The German question and the tasks of ensuring European 
security. 
"3. The Austrian State Treaty." 
This agenda was subsequently unanimously accepted by all 
four powers. The press played up as a big concession by the West- 
ern Powers that they had accepted the agenda as proposed by 
' 3 
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Molotov. It is difficult, however, to see how they could have done I 
othemise, since Mr. Molotov had included exactly the points 
that both sides had agreed to discuss in the process of the long 
exchange of notes preceding the conference. 
Seaetary of State John Foster Dulles spoke after the other 
three. (He had, in fact, secured acceptance of the French alpha- 
bet to determine the order of seating, so that despite the promi- 
nence given to M. Bidault at the opening, it always fell to Mr. 
Dulles to answer Mr. Molotov's major statements, and the fiction 
of French initiative did not last very long.) 
Mr. Dulles started out by saying that the opening address by 
Mr. Molotov "was a profound disappointment," that it contained 
"nothing new," that he was saddened that Mr. Molotov had seized 
upon this occasion "to repeat the old false charges and recrimi- 
nations." 
h e  was, of course, referring to ~ r .  ~olotov's comments on the 
real p u r p o ~ s  of NATO and EDC, on the growing number of U.S. 
military bases throughout the world. In view of the fact that the 
Soviet Union had made crystal clear in the pre-conference ex- 
changes that the main obstacle to a Geman settlement was the 
EDC plan for rearming Germany, Mr. Molotov could hardly have 
avoided going at once into this matter, which had to be at the 
heart of any realistic discussions. 
Mr. Dulles spent considerable time in buttering up M. Bidault 
for taking a magnanimous attitude toward Germany despite all 
that Fra-nce had suffered at the hands of Nazism. He even went so 
far as to compare Bidault with Lincoln for his spirit of 
toward none and charity toward all." 
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He contrasted the attitude of Mr. Molotov as "evoking the 
spirit of vengeance and hatred marking the Treaty of Versailles." 
Secretary Dulles said there was no known substitute for EDC, 
insisting that its sole purpose is to prevent German militarism and 
that it envisages only ". . . a modest defense force in which indi- 
vidual Germans have a minority part and the whole of which is 
dedicated to defensive purposes." 
On the question of a Five-Power Conference, Mr. Dulles 
launched into a most violent attack on the Chinese People's Re- 
public as a "convicted aggressor." He declared that the United 
States does not deny its existence or refuse to deal with it as occa- 
sion requires, but "It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a 
fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's lbreast *and call it 
good. . . ." He then declared unequivocally that the United States 
"will not agree to join in a Five-Power Conference with the Chi- 
nese Communist aggressors for the purpose of dealing generally 
with the peace of the world." 
I t  was noted, however, that this categorical refusal was con- 
fined to general questions of peace, and that the door was not 
closed to the possibility of a conference on specific questions. 
Regarding the role allocated by Mr. Dulles to France, the New 
York Times of January 28 reported, contrasting the position at 
the conference of the United States, Britain and France, at Ber- 
muda: "Frenchmen were surprised and pleased, yet a trifle du- 
bious, upon learning today that France apparently had been pre 
moted from a kind of junior partnership to the position of senior 
spokesman for the three Western Powers." Among the French, 
the dispatch continued, 
". . . some thought Mr. Dulles had rather overdone his tribute 
to France since in December he warned her against dropping 
European integration, but yesterday he treated her as though 
she were burning with ardor for both military and political 
integration. It looked to some as if Mr. Dzllles had already 
forgotten M. Bidault's long and vehement speech in Bermuda 
explaining how hard it would be to sell the European army 
treaty to the French Parliament. . . ." 
Commenting on the speech of Mr. Dulles, Mr. Molotov said 
that it appeared that Mr. Dulles had counterpoised the viewpoint 
of the Soviet delegation to that of the French and British, and 
he did not think this was a correct approach to the conference. 
He said of course there was no use trying to pretend that there 
were no disputes between the delegates, but that the important 
thing was not only to determine what questions were in dispute, but 
to single out those questions on which agreements might be reached. 
Referring to a remark .by Mr. Eden to the effect that the British 
delegation could see no compromise in connection with certain 
points, Mr. Molotov continued: 
"This is all very well. But does it mean that we have as- 
sembled with the idea that neither British nor French nor 
American nor Soviet representatives would make any compre 
mise? 
"I believe that we have assembled not in order to make 
categorical statements, but in order to hear one another and to 
find ways to agreement on questions on which we can agree 
today; as for questions on which agreement cannot be reached 
today and whch should be considered inadequately F P T ~  
for decision, we should, of course, continue their lscussion 
tomorrow or at a moment we shall find appropriate." 
Mr. Molotov showed that there was no justification fa r  Mr. 
Dulles'. charge that the Soviet Union was evoking the spirit of 
V d l c s .  The Soviet Union, he said, was not a signatory to that 
treaty, as were the three Western Powers, and was in no way 
responsible for it. The Soviet Union was, however, a signatory 
to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, which rejected any vindic- 
I 
tive policy toward the  ema an people, and theiefore had a joint 
responsibility in carrying out their provisions, which offered a 
basis for a democratic and peaceable Germany. He made very 
clear that those aspects of the Potsdam Agreement which were of 
a provisional character, referring to the immediate post-war situa- 
tion, had lost their validity, but that its main principles, safe- 
guarding the security of Europe and of Germany itself, remained 
valid. He asked, in effect, whether the signatures of the powers 
that signed the treaty were to be cheapened, or the agreement ad- 
hered to. The Western Powers gave their answer in the com- 
plete rejection of Potsdam. 
On a Five-Power Conference 
DISCUSSION F AGENDA ITEM 1: Measures for lessen- 
ing the tension in international relations and con- 
vocation of o conference of the Foreign Ministers of 
France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China. 
OPENING the discussion of the first point on the agenda, Mr. 
Molotov declared that it requires no proof that China with its 
500,000,000 people must be treated as a great power, and the estab- 
lishment of the People's Republic of China as a great historic 
event. 
Regarding Secretary Dulles' charges against People's China 
which he had based on the UN resolution declaring China an 
aggressor, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that resolution had done 
no honor to the United Nations and had in fact undermined its 
authority. He declared: 
". . . We must not forget that the Chinese volunteers inter- 
vened in Korean events at a time when the troops of other 
states had reached the border of China, the Yalu River, when 
a threat was created to the boundaries of the People's Republic 
of China. That cannot be said of the United States of America. 
Those military developments took place at a distance of 7,000 
to 8,000 kilometers from the borders of the United States, but 
only a few kilometers from the borders of the People's Re- 
public of China, and it is clear that the friendly states-the 
People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Deme 
cratic Republic, found a common language. It follows that it 
is entirely out of place to speak here of aggression, to say nothing 
of the fact that it is completely at variance with the real state 
of affairs." 
Mr. Molotov noted further that the role of People's China 
in bringing about the armistice in Korea had to be borne in mind 
in considering the importance of China in the over-all question of 
strengthening peace. 
Replying to an objection raised .by Mr. Dulles that five powers 
should not have the right to give orders to other states, Mr. Molo- 
tov said he was in agreement with this and nothing of the sort 
was intended. He said the Four Powers were meeting in Berlin 
not to give orders to other states, but to assist in finding solutions 
to international questions that would be helpful to their own pee 
ples and peoples of other states, and that a Five-Power meeting was 
quite as legitimate for this purpose as a Four-Power meeting. 
Mr. Molotov then proposed that there be a conference in the 
spring of 1954, including the four Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Berlin and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, 
to consider, in conformity with United Nations principles, such 
questions as armaments reduction, political problems and the im- 
provement of relations between countries, the increase of interna- 
tional trade, especially East-West trade, and any other questions 
pertaining to lessening the tension in international relations. 
Mr. Dulles was extremely sarcastic in his reply. He paid tribute 
to Mr. Molotov's diplomatic skill (in fact he was reported in the 
press as having the opinion that Mr. Molotov was the most slcillful 
diplomat of the last hundred years) in pulling out solutions to all 
problems like rabbits out of a hat, and in seeming to suggest that 
everything could be solved "if we were to invite Mr. Chou En-lai 
to sit down with us." 
Renewing his previous sharp attacks on the Chinese People's 
Republic, in anything but that fine Lincolnesque spirit he had 
found so commendable in M. Bidault's attitude toward Germany, 
the U.S. Secretary of State declared: 
"Who is this Mr. Chou En-lai? We is the leader of a regime 
which gained de facto power on the China mainland throu h 
bloody war, which has liquidated millions of Chinese as 8 e  
only means of maintaining its power, which so diverts the eco- 
nomic resources of its impoverished people to military efforts 
that they starve lby the millions . . ." 
He said, referring to Molotov's proposals, that "our moral eense 
forbids the relationship he proposes."+ 
Strangely, Mr. Dulles' moral sense does not forbid relationship 
with the discredited dictator Chiang Kai-shek, although it is in 
fact his repudiated regime that this description fits, and not the 
regime of which Chou En-lai is Premier and Foreign Minister, 
which has the support of the 500,000,000 Chinese people. 
Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault seemingly consented to Mr. 
Dulles' rejection of a Five-Power Conference. When Mr. Eden, 
e 
whose rejiction lacked the determination of Mr. Dulles', pmposed 
that the discussion be deferred, and it was later decided to >oitinue 
it in restricted sessions, Mr. Molotov agreed. 
M o r e  leaving the first item on the agenda, Mr. Molotov re- L minded the Foreign Ministers that this point also called for a con- 
sideration of "measures for reducing tensions in international 1 
relations." l Pointing to the arms race as one of the greatest causes of world 
tensions, he proposed that a world conference on general reduction 
of armaments be convened in 1954, and offered a resolution pro- 
viding that the Four Powers- 1 
". . . guided by a desire to strengthen peace and reduce ten- 
sion in international relations, and considering it necessary to 
take measures to relieve the heavy burden of military expendi- 
tures borne by the peo le in connection with the armaments K race, have agreed that t e Soviet Union, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France would take measures within the 
framework of the United Nations to convene in 1954 a world 
conference on general reduction of armaments with the partici- 
pation of both the members of the United Nations and non- 
member states. Full agreement has been reached that the 
of measures for the general reduction of armaments ~ h o u l ~ ~ ~  
linked up with a simultaneous solution of the problem of atomic 
weapons." 
Still carrying the ball for the three Western Powers, M. Bidault 
reiected the idea of a disarmament conference this year, and intrcl 
diced a counter-resolution asking that the Soviet proposal be re- 
ferred to the UN Disarmament Commission for study, adding the 
provision that such a conference should not be held until all hostil- 
ities, such as in Indo-China, be first ended and aggression outlawed. 
What happened during the subsequent discussions on Item One 
of the agenda is not known, since they were held in secret. However, 
it became increasingly clear as the conference went on that both 
M. Bidault and Mr. Eden were pressing for a conference with Pee  
See Appendix, page 64, for pertinent rtatcment 'by a Chinese Quaker. 
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ple's China, and that the insistent demands of the French people 
for a move to end the war in Indo-China would make the position 
of M. Bidault untenable if he could not bring something out of the 
conference pointing in that direction. 
It was also clear that despite Mr. Dulles' original flat rejection 
of the idea of a conference including People's China this spring, he 
yielded on this point in order to prevent any possibility that France 
might open direct negotiations with Ho Chi-Minh, leaving the 
United States out of the picture. 
The final agreement to hold this conference, as set forth in the 
Communique on page 53, thus became the main accomplishment 
at Berlin. 
It was not the kind of conference Mr. Molotov and many othcrs 
had hoped for. Instead of covering the over-all world issues in 
which People's China must inevitably play a part, the conference 
was limited to the questions of Korea and Indo-China. The Western 
Powers, under Mr. Dulles' insistence, refused to agree that the 
People's Republic of China be one of the inviting powers. Mr. 
Molotov's concessions on these points made possible the convocation 
of the conference. 
At Mr. Dulles' insistence, the sentence was added that neither 
the invitation nor the holding of the conference "shall be deemed 
to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already 
been accorded" in order to avoid any conclusion that the inclusion 
of the Chinese People's Republic was a step toward recognition on 
the part of the United States. Of course this equally applies to the 
Syngman Rhee Government, which the Soviet Union does not rec- 
ognize. 
What was really accomplished was that through this conference 
the long-delayed political conference on Korea, stalled since the 
breaking off of the Panmunjom negotiations by the United States, 
was finally scheduled. 
Nothing was said as to the condition reportedly raised frequently 
by the Western Powers in the course of the discussions that "Chi- 
nese aid" to Ho Chi-Minh must cease before a conference with 
People's China could be held. Indeed, this would have been an 
awkward point to insist upon, in view of the massive scale of United 
States military assistance to the French and the recent dispatch of 
additional U.S. Air Force technicians to Inddhina.  
Despite all Mr. Dulles' attempts to put a good face on the 
Geneva conference by saying that he "got loo per a n t  what he 
wanted," although he had made quite dear at the beginning that 
he wanted no such conference at all, this conference is in fact much 
nearer to the round table conference which most of the United 
Nations members had desired than the conference of two hostile 
rlda which the United States had been trying to achieve. It does 
not have the advantage of including other neutral interested coum 
tries of the Far East such as India, but neither does it, despite Mr. 
Dulles' insistence to the contrary, designate the Soviet Union, an 
inviting power, as a belligerent 
The final agreement on the disarmament question, simply pro- 
viding for an exchange of views as provided for in the United 
Nations Resolution of November 38, 1953 (which had referred the 
matter to the Disarmament Commission), was a rather feeble one, 
and far from the plan for world disarmament conference in 1954 
desired by the Soviet Union. But any proposal to exchange views 
can be considered an advance, and opens a new opportunity for 
steps to end the H-Bomb nightmare. 
O n  Germany 
And European Security 
DISCUSSION OF AGENDA I ~ M  P: The German Ques- 
tion and the task of muring European security. 
AN ELABORATE plan was worked out ,by Mr. Dulles, Mr. 
Eden and M. Bidault, to sidetrack further discussion of Mr. Molo- 
tov's disarmament proposal and get on immediately to the question 
of Germany. 
Mr. Dulles, in the course of the discussions of the Molotov pro 
posal, commented sourly: 
"So far all this conference has done-now in its fifth day of 
deliberations-is to discuss futilely how to create new confer- 
ences, and the new conferences do nothing better than to create 
more new conferences, that the whole conference method will 
become an object of ridicule, and we with it." 
How little Mr. Dulles seems to understand or care about the 
desires of the people of the world who are asking at the moment 
for nothing better than that the big powers keep on talking and 
keep on arranging new conferences, knowing that each day that 
they talk together, each new conference that is arranged, makes war 
less likely. 
1 the maneuvers to circumvent Mr. Molotov w a r  quite unncc- 14 
He himself turned immediately to the question of Germany 
sion, declaring that his governmknt had no 
conference and would seek in every way to 
f 
eign Minister began with a forceful plea that 
resentatives of the German Democratic Republic and of the 
m a n  Federal Republic be invited to take part in the discussions 
on the German problem. He reported that on January 37 he had 
turned over to the conference a communication received from the 
German Democratic Republic suggesting the participation of their 
representatives. Mr. Molotov said that while no such request had 
been received from the German Federal Republic, he hardly thought 
they would not wish also to be represented. For his part, he said 
he was not familiar with the position of the West German Gov- 
ernment on many issues, and would like to hear their viewpoint. 
The Soviet Government had always held that there could be no 
wttlement of the German question in a peaceful and democratic 
manner without participation by the Germans themselves. 
Mr. Dulles brushed off the proposal, indicating that there was 
rro proper governmental authority in Eastern Germany, and no 
representatives "freely and legally chosen" could appear on her 
behalf. Since Britain and France went along with the United States 
o possibility of gaining agreement, Mr. Mol- 
gness to proceed with the discussion, although 
d to this point as essential to any peaceful 
The Eden Proposal 
i: Anthony Eden thereupon proposed a five-stage plan for German 
unification. While he presented it as his own, Clifton Daniels 
reported in the New York Times, January go, that the plan had 
been drafted by experts of the United States, Great Britain and 
France and was "heartily approved by the West German Govern- 
The five stages outlined by the British Foreign Minister were, 
throughout Germany. 11. The convening of a 
sulting from these elections. 111. The drafting 
the preparation of peace treaty negotiations 
IV. The adoption of the constitution and the formation of an all- 
responsible for the negotiation of the peace 
treaty. V. The signature and entry into .force of the peace treaty. 
How simple, direct and reasonable. No encumlbering provisions 
a b u t  t h a  agreed-upon Potsdam safeguards against the Nazis and 
monopolists coming back to power and those troublesome assur- 
ances that Germany "will never again be able to destroy the peace 
of the world." No dangerous ideas about the German people being 
able to work things out for themselves. No complicated considera- 
tions as to how to remnde the monopoly-based regime in the West 
with the people's regime of the East. No hampering restrictions - 
about the time for ending Allied occupation, the withdrawal of 
in Western Germany. Too simple perhaps? Let us see how Mr. 
Eden elaborated on his proposals. 
Mr. Eden enunciated the noble principles behind his plan: 
foreign forces or what would happen to United States military bases I 
"Free elections are the only way of obtaining a true expression of 
the people's will." 
(Mr. Eden's concern for free elections might have carried more 
weight had it not been for certain recent events in Guiana where 
the British Government, not liking the direction the people's will 
was taking, sent troops and war ships to throw out a government 
which had received an overwhelming majority in free elections, and 
suspended the democratically adqted constitution under which 
the will of the people was being carried out.) 
And how would the German people be enabled "freely to choose 
their own representatives" while the foreign occupation forces still 
remained? Mr. Eden declared that safeguards and supervision 
would obviously be necessary. He said an adequate election law 
must first be drawn up by the Four Powers, who could "draw on" 
both the Bundestag in the West and the Assembly in the East for 
proposals from drafts already made. The electoral law would 
contain guarantees of complete freedom of association, meetings, 
press, radio, television, the right of any party to present candidates, 
and so on. 
Then there must be supervision by a commission on which each 
of the Four Powers should be represented. Neutrals might be added 
-that could be discussed. All the decisions of this commission 
would be on a majority basis (insuring, though Mr. Eden did not 
mention this, that the decisions would always be in favor of the 
Western Powers, outnumbering the Soviet represents tives three to 
one, and hence in favor of the Bonn regime.) 
This commission would continue its supervisory functions dur- 
ing the elections themselves. While the elected assembly was pre- 
paring the constitution, a provisional all-German authority might 
be set up which could help in drawing up the constitution, prepare 
the nucleus of a future all-German administrative machine and 
open negotiations on a peace treaty which could be concluded when 
the new government formed under the constitution came into 
king. In the meantime, the German Federal Republic and the 
German Administration in the Soviet Zone (the Western powem 
usually followed Mr. Dulles in using this term rather than the am 
rect name of German Democratic Republic M. Bidault and Mr. 
Eden sometimes made this concession, but Mr. Dulles never did) 
would continue in being, transferring their powers to the new ~ O V -  
ernment when established. 
And now the rub. There must not be a complete break in Ger- 
man international relationships. This means a united Germany is 
to join the EDC, and far from taking into account the main prob 
lem of preventing the revival of German militarism, specifically 
provides for such revival. Mr. Eden declared: 
"The all-German government, once established, must be free 
to assume such of the international rights and obligations of the 
Federal Republic, and of the Soviet Zone in Germany, as it con- 
siders necessary. I t  must also be free to conclude other inter- 
national agreements, if it so desires, provided of course that they 
are consistent with the United Nations Charter. On the other 
hand, our four governments have special rights and responsibil- 
ities in Germany until a peace treaty comes into force." 
Since the peace treaty was relegated to the final stage of Mr. 
Eden's plan, this meant that the occupation would continue indef- 
initely. Elections carried on under the control of foreign govern- 
ments and their armed forces would be, of course, the opposite of 
free elections. 
Furthermore, a strange feature of this plan, presented as the 
only way "of obtaining a true expression of the people's will," was 
that it took no account whatsoever of the will of the 18,000,ooo peo- 
ple in Eastern Germany. 
The proposals of the German Democratic Republic were pre- 
sented to the Foreign Ministers on January go by Mr. Molotov, 
but no one but Mr. Molotov, who later embodied them in his own 
plan, paid any attention to them. 
Mr. Dulles and M. Bidault enthusiastically supported the Eden 
plan. 
Molotov's Proposal for  a Peace Treaty 
Mr. Molotov took quite a different approach to the German 
question, from that of Mr. Eden who, he remarked, had "spoken 
as a scholastic constitutionalist of the strict German type." He 
said Mr. Eden's plan for elections required serious consideration, 
b u t  there were fundamental issues that came first. 
TheSoviet Foreign Minister declared that the main aim before 
the conference was to insure the peace of Europe and to prevent 
the resurgence of German militarism. Thus the question of the 
peace treaty with Germany had to take precedence over purely 
mechanical election procedures, and he would address himself first 
to that. 
Recalling the temble sacrifices of his own and other peoples in 
the last world war, the destruction of tens of thousands of cities and 
villages, the loss of millions of human lives, Molotov urged that 
the attention of the Foreign Ministers be centered on making sure 
that these things should never be repeated. 
Molotov asserted that the Soviet Union's position was that the 
Four Powers present should be guided by their joint wartime 
a&rectnents: 
"These agreements stipulated that the Soviet Union, the 
United States and Great Britain will act jointly to help the 
German people reestablish their state on democratic and peace- 
ful lines. France, too, acceded to these decisions in the past, 
although today Mr. Bidault time and again disassociates him- 
self from these agreed decisions. I think, however, that France 
* 
needs these agreements no less than, say, the Soviet Union. 
"We admit that not a few points of the Potsdam Agreements 
are already out of date. Nevertheless, the main purpose of 
these agreements fully remains in force. The purpose of these 
agreements is that in settling the German problem, France, the 
USSR, Britain and the United States of Amer.ica act jointly and 
that our countries find a common language with the German 
people, namely with their democratic forces, in order to prevent 
a new war in Europe." 
Mr. Molotov said that the ruins of Berlin all around them 
brought home what the German people themselves had suffered, 
and that the Soviet delegation considered that "the German prob- 
lem is first of all a matter for the German people themselves." 
Because of the circumstances of the World War, the four countries 
present had a special role to play until the conclusion of a peace 
treaty. If the four countries would act together, and not try to use 
even a part of Germany for opposing some European countries 
against others, it would be possible to solve the German problem 
successfully, and to achieve a unified, democratic and peaceful Ger- 
many that would enter the ranks of equal European countries. But, 
he declared: 
"Plans for the establishment of a so-called 'European Defense 
Community' are impelling Germany onto another path . . . 
three coun tries-the United States of America, Britain and 
France-are trying, together with ofhdal cirdes of present-day 
oc directed against 
ssible to draw in 
e remarked that it was strange indeed that certain French 
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Union could not but take into 
unt these measures since they were openly directed against the 
USSR and the People's Democracies, and were supplemented by the 
85 
a m  of sabotage and subversion carried on in the Soviet Union, the 
People's Democracies and the Soviet zones in Germany and Austria 
under U.S. "Mutual Security Act" appropriations. 
He pointed out that the Bonn and Paris agreements, designed 
to attach Western Germany to the North Atlantic military group- 
ing, are evidently supposed to replace a Peace Treaty. Under thee 
agreements, he said, Western Germany would for 50 years to come 
be in the position of a semi-ompied country, deprived of national 
sovereignty and independence in its foreign affairs. And it was now 
proposed that this system be extended throughout Germany. He I: 
warned that no German could be expected to follow such a path 
voluntarily: 
"Indeed, can anyone believe that for an indefinitely long i 1 
period the Germans in Western Germany will tolerate a situa- I 
tion wherein they are unable to settle independently either their 
internal affairs or questions of their foreign relations with other 
countries? How can one picture to oneself a situation that in 
some part of Germany, in the given instance Western Germany, 
three Western countries-the United States, Britain and France 
-could at any moment interfere in its internal life, introduce a 
state of emergency whenever they wish, and in general play the 
part of unlimited lords and masters? . . . If same official persons 1 
of present-day Germany now agree to this, it is by no means ' 
because, while observing enforced docility today, they are think- 
ing seriously that it is possible to maintain such a state of affairs 
for decades to come." 
Molotov suggested that the German militarists could hardly be 
counted on to stop at the 12 divisions envisaged in the Paris Treaty. 
Since there was no possibility that the German Democratic Republic 
would follow the same road, the implementation of the Bonn and 
Paris agreements would create insurmountable barriers for the 
unification of Germany. He declared: 
". . . These projects will benefit only the German revanchists 
who are dreamlng of an early revival of German militarism and 
the expansion of their war industries." 
The Soviet Foreign Minister insisted that there was a way out, 
if the four countries would abandon their attempts to oppose each 
other, agree not to permit a resurgence of German militarism, and 
conclude a peace treaty. Two years ago the Soviet Government had 
submitted to the other three governments its draft of such a treaty, 
but had never received any comments or counter proposals. 
Molotov proposed that preparations for the peace treaty should 
be undertaken simul taneousl y with preparations for the establish- 
ment of an all-German government, as the British Foreign Secretary 
himself had proposed back in 1947, with the agreement of the 
United States and France. He suggested that the Deputy Foreign 
Ministers of the Four Powers prepare a draft treaty within three 
months. Representatives of East and West Germany should be 
drawn into the preparation of the peace treaty, but its final exami- 
nation and adoption should be carried on with the participation of 
the all-German government, and subject to ratification by an all- 
German parliament. The opinions of Allied states who took part 
in the war against Germany should also be sought in preparing the 
treaty. 
Molotov made clear that the only basis on which an alLGmnan 
government could be set up was on the basis of free electiau, and 
that the expediting of such elections war one of the main duties of 
the conference. 
Mr. Molotov declared that the very fact of starting preparations 
for a peace treaty would facilitate the joint work of the Four Pow- 
ers, and rapprochement between both parts of Germany as well as 
accelerating progress toward the holding of allGerman elections 
and the formation of an all-German government. 
He then submitted an amended draft of the Soviet proposals 
for a peace treaty with Germany, and proposed that a peace con- 
ference be convened within six months, or at any rate not later 
than October 1954, for considering it, along with any counter pro- 
posals the other governments concerned might make, or any new 
draft that might be agreed upon. 
Following the preamble which stressed the major importance 
of the speedy conclusion of the treaty in the interests of peace in 
Europe and in the world, the Soviet text outlining the proposed 
principles of the treaty is as follows: 
Principles for a Peace Treaty with Germany 
Participants: The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the 
United States, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and other states whose armed forces took part in 
the war with Germany. 
Political Clauses: 1. Germany shall be reestablished as an 
integral state. This will put an end to the partition of Germany 
and make it possible f o r  a united Germany to develop as an 
independent, democratic and peaceable state. 
2. All armed forces of occupying powers shall be withdrawn 
from Germany not later than one year from the day the peace 
treaty enters into force. Simultaneously all foreign military 
bases on Germany's territory shall be eliminated. 
3. The German people shall be guaranteed democratic 
rights: Every person under German jurisdiction, irrespective of 
me, sex, language or religion, shall enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, re- 
ligion, political opinion, and assembly. 
4. Democratic parties and organizations in Germany shall 
be guaranteed freedom of activity, with the right freely to 
decide their internal affairs, hold congresses and meetings, and 
enjoy freedom of the press and publication. 
5. The existence of organizations hostile to democracy and 
the maintenance of peace shall not be permitted on German 
territory. 
6. All former personnel of the German Army, including 
officers and generals, and all ex-Nazis, with the exception of 
those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes, 
shall be granted civil and political rights on an equal footing 
with all other German citizens, thus enabling them to partici- , 
pate in the building of a peaceable and democratic Germany. . , 
7. Germany shall pledge herself not to enter into any coali- ' 
tions or military alliances directed against any country whose 
armed forces took part in the war with Germany. 
8. No obligations of a political or military nature shall be 
imposed on Germany as a result of treaties or agreements ccm- , 
cluded by the Government of the German Federal Republic 
and the German Democratic Republic prior to the signing of a 
peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of Germany 
as an integral state. [Clause 8 added to original draft] MI 
Territorye: The territory of Germany shall be determined ' 
by boundaries fixed in the decisions of the Potsdam conference! 1 
of the Great Powers. 
Economic Clauses: I. No restrictions shall be imposed upon 
Germany with respect to the development of her peace economy, 
which must serve to promote the welfare of the German people. 1,; 
Nor shall any restrictions be imposed upon Germany in respect 
to trade with other countries, navigation and access to world 
markets. 
s. Germany shall be fully released fmm payment of nz- li '1 
tional postwar debts to the United States of America, the United 
While no discussion of the question of Germany's eastern boundaries was 
reported to have taken place, this is a vital issue for future peace. Chancellor 
Adcnauer has openly announced his intention to regain by force the territories 
beyond the Oder-Neisse line, which ,by Allied agreement were recovered by 
Poland after the war, wibh the understanding that this would be confiraned in 
the peace treaty with Germany. 
Kingdom, France and the USSR, excepting indebtedness on 
trade obligations. [Clause 2 added to original draft] 
Military Ckzwes: 1. Germany shall be permitted to have 
such national armed forces (land, air and naval) as shall be re- 
quired for the country's defense. The size of these armed forces 
shall be limited in conformity with tasks of an internal nature, 
local defense of frontiers, and air defense. [Second sentence 
added to original draft] • 
2. Germany shall be permitted to produce war material8 
and weapons, but only in quantities and of types required for 
the armed forces sanctioned by the peace treaty. 
Germany and the United Nations: The states which sign 
the peace treaty with Germany shall support her application for 
admission to the United Nations. 
In the course of the subsequent discussion, M. Bidault, giving his 
full support to the Eden plan, declared that Molotov was mistaken 
in thinking that the international obligations assumed by the Ger- 
man Federal Republic would be autamatially extended to all 
Germany af ter unification: 
"It means on the contrary, giving to the government of a 
united Gemany a full liberty of choice. . . . I t  will be up to the 
German government itself to decide if it desires to assuwe the 
international obligations previously contracted by the Federal 
Republic or by the German Democratic Republic" 
Mr. Eden hastened to give similar assurances: 
"We have no intention of demanding that the new German 
Government should be bound in advance to accept the EM= 
Treaty or any other international obligations. We think that 
it will wish to do so and it is our strong conviction that in such 
an organization Germany will be safer for herself and a safer 
neighbor for all Europe." 
Now these were very interesting declarations indeed. The whole 
purpose of the European Defense Community was supposedly to 
insure that the German Army would become permanently a part 
of the Bnation European army and under its control, and would 
have no chance to withdraw, and it was on this basis, supposedly 
an ironbound safeguard against Germany ever again being in a : !a 
position to form an aggressive national army, that the United 
States and Britain have been pressuring a reluctant France and 
Italy to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty and endorse 
the reestablishment of a German Wehmacht. 
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Dulles Answers Molotov 
Mr. Dulles rejected the Soviet peace treaty proposals. 
He declared flatly that under no circumstances would he 
deal with the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, 
thus underlining the intention of the Western Powers to extend 
the Bonn regime through all af Germany. He said that the govern- 
ment in West Germany "draws its authority from the people as 
a result of free and vigorously contested elections," while he de- 
scribed the elections in East Germany as having been conducted 
by threats of force. 
He said this was why he could not accept the position "that the 
four of us should accept the so-called German Democratic Republic 
as one of the principal organs whereby the German problem is 
solved," that the German people would regard as "contaminated 
any decisions "fastened upon them through the interposition of the 
'German People's Republic.' " 
The Secretary of State said that Mr. Molotov had "sought to 
divert us from serious discussion" by his charges that the Western 
Powers were trying to form a military bloc directed against the 
h i e t  Union. Referring to American sacrifices in two wars against 
Germany he declared: 
"In the light of that history, the United States feels that it 
has earned the right to shrug off, as foolish chatter, the accusa- 
tion that it now seeks to recreate the very force that has twice so 
cruelly hurt it." 
Mr. Dulles, defending the NATO system, insisted that the West- 
ern security arrangements were "a mighty safeguard against aggres- 
sion," since no one nation could act alone, but only through the 
combined will of many nations. He declared: 
"The greatest danger to world peace lies in the fact that in 
some cases a vast military establishment can be made to attack 
by the decision of a single nation, sometimes indeed by the deci- 
sion of a single man. This is a situation which is understand- 
ably terrifying." 
While Mr. Dulles intended this as a barb at the Soviet Union, 
he was, in fact, presenting the main argument against his own posi- 
tion. All Europe knows that any such danger comes not from the 
Soviet Union but from the remilitarized Germany advocated by 
Mr. Dulles. And the description also comes very close to Mr. Dulles' 
own instant, massive, atomic retaliation policy. 
Mr. Dulles' fulminations were echoed, though rather more 
palely, by Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault. While the three Western , ; Ministers accused Mr. Molotov of failing to discuss their proposals 
- $or free elections, although he had assured them he was coming to 
that question later, not one of them entered into any discussion at 
all of the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty. Mr. Molotov 
made it quite dear he was ready to discuss any counter-prop& 
they might offer. 
Molotov Proposes a Referendum 
Answering the attacks on his proposals, Mr. Molotov returned 
to the question of the European Defense Community as the heart 
of the question of freedom of choice for the German people. 
He said that in fact no real freedom was insured the German 
people either in the preparation of or during elections under Mr. 
Eden's project, since under the Bonn Agreement the three Western 
Powers are given for decades to come the right to interfere in the 
internal afEairs of Western Germany and to proclaim a state of 
emergency whenever they wished. No one had as yet answered 
this point. Mr. Molotov asked: 
"It is sometimes said that obligations assumed under the 
Bonn and Paris agreements would be in force only until a peace 
treaty is signed, but in that case why is it proposed to conclude 
the Bonn and Paris agreements for a term of fifty years? Does 
this not signify that no serious importance k attached to the 
promise of the Western Powers to expedite the conclusion of a 
peace treaty, since in fact it is held that the Germans will have 
to wait for decades for a peace treaty?" 
Mr. Molotov pointed out that the statements made by Mr. Eden 
and M. Bidault that a unified German government would not be 
bound by the terms of the Bonn and Paris agreements, were contra- 
dictory to the very terms of the Bonn Agreement, Article 7, para- 
graph n, of which reads: 
"The Three Powers (the United States, Britain and France) 
and the Federal 
added) 
Thus, the integration into the European Community is deter- 
mined in advance of the coming into existence of a new govern- 
men6 A further paragraph binds the Federal Republic not to con- 
dude any agreement which would lessen this obligation, except by 
common consent of all three Western states, which means that it is , 
prevented from entering into any plan for unification which does 
not provide for Germany's integration within EDC. 
He showed that these obligations assumed by Western Germany - 
wen further bolstered by a Three-Power Declaration issued by the 
United States, France and Britain, May 27, 1952, in connection I 
with the signing of the Paris Agreement, which declares that if any 
action threatens the unity of the European Community, these gov- 
ernments would regard this "as a threat to their own security,'' and 
would act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
(Article 4 provides that the "parties will consult together when- 1 
ever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, polit- 
ical independence or security of any of them is threatened.") In 
tried to leave the integrated army, once established. 
Refeming to Mr. Dulles' assertion that the government of West 
Germany is authoritative, while refusing to recognize the authority 
of the East German government, Mr. Molotov proposed verifying 
other words, they threatened reprisal if Germany or any other nation , 
how matters really stand, by a pull of the German people them- 
selves, through a nation-wide referendum. 
Since the West German authorities uphold the Bonn and Paris 
agreements and are in no hurry as regards a peace treaty, while the 
Geman Democratic Republic opposes these agreements and sup- 
ports the earliest possible conclusion of a peace treaty, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister asked: 
"Why not propose to hold a popular poll, to hold a refer- 
endum throughout Germany in order to ascertain what the 
German people stand for: for the Bonn-Paris agreements, or 
for a peace treaty? 
"Then we would all have a clear answer to the question 
as to who really voices the aspirations of the German people 
in our days." 
Mr. Molotov's referendum plan was ignored by Mr. Dulles and 
Mr. Eden. Mr. Bidault rejected it as containing "loaded ques- 
tions." 
The East German People's Chamber endorsed the idea by a 
unanimous vote. 
The Bonn government attacked the proposal. 
The three Western Powers again assured Mr. Molotov that a 
reunited Germany would be completely free to reject membership 
in the E X .  Secretary Dulles sought to end the argument by pro- 
posing'an amendment to the Western proposal for German uni- 
fication, suggesting that the phrase "Germany must be free to as- 
sulne any international rights and obligations of the Federal Re- 
public or of the East German regime" should be changed to read, 
"must be free to assume or reject." But no suggestion came from 
the West for revision of the Bonn and Paris treaties themselves 
to eliminate their binding character. 
In a radio broadcast from Berlin, February 7, CBS commenta- 
tor Howard K. Smith referred to the fact that every time Mr. Molo- 
tov repeated that a future German government would be bound 
by the EDC agreement, the three Western representatives denied 
it. Mr. Smith said that some observers "thought that Molotov was 
out of his wits by his insistence," a ~ d  
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"In fact. his wits never served him better. The people of 
France are now in grave doubt whether to agree to thoie Geaties 
that would allow Germany to rearm. They have been told by 
the Western leaders that there, is no danger, for Germany once 
rearmed would be bound into the integrated army, unable to 
make decisions of its own. . . . All that Molotov was doing by 
his performance here this week was getting the Western lead- 
ers to deny their past assuran to the French people. He got 
the Western three, one by o n r t o  stand and to repeat several 
times that Germany would not be bound by integration. After 
France has agreed to Adenauer forming a West German army, 
West Germany might then unite with East Germany and the 
resulting stronger unified Germany would no longer be limited 
by the integrated European army command. 
"In coming weeks, when the European army plan comes up 
for debate in France, these statements by Western leaders 
provoked from them by Molotov here, are .likely to be heard 
again and again to discourage the French Parliament from 
agreeing to treaties to allow West Germany to have an army." 
Soviet Plan for German Elections and Unification 
Mr. Molotov then turned to a discussion of the Eden plan and 
the counter-proposals of the USSR. He pointed out that the com- 
plex problems involved in uniting the two parts of Germany could 
not be solved by the merely formal and technical approach of the 
Eden plan. The substance of the matter had to come first. 
It was necessary, he said, to reckon with the existence in Ger- 
many of the German Democratic Republic and the German Fed- 
eral Republic, each with its own government and constitution, 
separate currency, separate border and internal police. He de- 
scribed some of the differences in the two parts of Germany: 
"In conformity with the decision of the Potsdam confer- 
ence, monopolies and cartels have been fully liquidated in 
Eastern Germany, their existence is prohibited by the Consti- 
tution, and the large-scale property of Hitlerite war criminals 
has been turned over to the people. Democratic land reform 
has been carried out with the lands of tbe big Junkers, who 
were the bulwark of German militarism, having been turned 
over to the land-hungry peasants and settlers. 
"In Western Germany, notwithstanding the decision taken 
in Potsdam to eliminate the excessive concentration of eco- 
nomic power, cartels and monopolies continue to dominate 
the economy. Land reform has not been carried out there to 
this day, and war aiminals and militarists play an ever greater 
part in the government and the economy." 
Molotov declared Mr. Eden's plan did not meet the test that 
all plans for unification must be in conformity with the aim of 
establishing a peace-loving, democratic Germany. German history 
showed that parliamentary procedures alone could not achieve 
this, since Hitler's advent to power had been prepared in a par- 
liamentary way. Molotov reviewed the parliamentary elections 
of i g l ~ ,  and the maneuvers through which von Papen, Hinden- 
berg, Schleicher and others had helped bring Hitler to power. 
He recalled that Adenauer springs from the same political roots 
as von Papen, both of them having belonged to the right wing 
of the "party of the enter" during the Weimar Republic. 
He pointed out that it was not parliamentary procedure that 
mattered, but the behind-the-scenes support of such magnates of 
heavy industry as the Thyssens, Krupps and others, and the millions 
of marks and tens of millions of dollars that flowed into the coffers 
of Hitler's National Socialist Party from the big bankers and in- 
dustrial magnates. 
He warned of the dangers of present day von Papens and 
Schleichers who will pave the way to bring new Hitlers to power. 
The five stages of the Eden plan contained no preventive measures 
on this point. The millions who had shed their blood fighting 
Hitleri te aggression could not rely on spontaneity, because- 
"It may happen, just as during the time of Hitler, that 
the worst, that 1s the antidemocratic elements, will take ad- 
vantar of the postwar difIiculties of the German people and find t emselvea at the crest of political life. There will also 
appear on the scene industrial magnates and banks that will 
again spend many millions of marks and dollars to place in 
power such'men as will disdain nothing in doing their bidding. 
There are such arrant gamblers of a revenge-seeking type in 
Western Germany. Not so long ago British occupation au- 
thorities, for example, spoke about the revival of fascist or- 
ganizations in Western Germany. This is a real menace not 
only to Germany's neighbors but also to tile Geman people 
themselves, and primarily to the overwhelming majority of the 
population, the working people of Germany." 
"Let us begin," urged Molotov, "with the internal pre- 
requisites for the unification of Germany along peaceable and 
deinocratic lines. This means, as we all desire, that the elections 
in Germany should be £ree and democratic, that they must be 
conducted by the German people themselves, and not by foreign 
occupation authorities as provided under the Eden plan." 
The procedure suggested by Mr. Molotov to accomplish this 
was embodied in a formal proposal "Oh the Establishment of a 
Provisional All-German Government and the Holding of Free 
All-German Elections." This proposal outlined measures for set- 
ting up an appropriate allGerman authority, so that the Ger- 
mans themselves would run the elections, and called for with- 
drawal of occupation troops even before elections, to insure against 
outside interference. Here in condensed form, itre his proposals 
for the internal prerequisites: 
T o  recommend to the governments of the German Deme 
cratic Republic and the German Federal Republic immediate 
convening of a conference of authorized representatives from 
each to work out procedures for establishing a provisional all- 
German government. 
The chief task of the provisional all-German 'government 
to be the preparation of a draft electoral law insuring par- 
ticipation of all democratic organizations; to verify and to in- 
sure existence throughout Germany 'of conditions re uisi te for 
holding of democratic elections under conditions o 9 genuine 
freedom, precluding pressure from the big monopolies on the 
voters, and to hold these elections without outside inter- 
ference. 
The provisional all-German government shall also repre- 
sent Germany in preparations for the peace treaty and in inter- 
national organizations; prevent Germany being drawn into 
military alliances; insure free activities of democratic parties 
and elections and prevent existence of fascist, militarist or other 
organizations hostile to democracy and peace; undertake the 
development of economic, trade and cultural relations be- 
tween East and West Germany, questions of transport and 
communications and free movement of people and goods 
throughout Germany and other questions pertaining to interests 
of the nation as a whole. 
All this, declared Molotov- 
". . . would make it possible to hold all-German elections 
in the immediate future under conditions of freedom. Thereby 
Germany would receive the opportunity to convene an all- 
German constituent assembly, elected in free elections. This 
all-German parliament would form not a provisional govern- 
ment, but a government enjoying full rights and resting on a 
democratic constitution. . . . #, 
As for external prerequisites to insure peaceful and democratic 
development of a unified Germany, he declared that the Paris 
Agreement on the participation of Western Germany in the Ewe 
pean army is incompatible with the interests of national indepen- 
dence of a unified Germany, and the policy of imposing on West 
Germany agreement on the European Defense Community would 
have to be abandoned, since the fifty-year provision would mean 
iu extension to Eastern Germany as well. 
Mr. Molotov emphasized that the withdrawal of occupation 
forces, provided for in the Soviet proposals, was of particular im- 
portance: 
'To preclude any pressure on the elections by occupation 
authorities, it is necessy even before the elections are held, 
to withdraw the occupation troops from the territory of East- 
ern and Western Germany. In this case only limited contin- 
gents of troops could remain on the territory of Germany which 
are necessary *for carrying out security functions arising from 
the control tasks of the Four Powers: for the USSR-with regard 
to Eastern Germany; for the United States, Britain and France 
-with regard to Western Germany." 
A final objection to Mr. Eden's draft, said Molotov, was that 
it would lead to endless disputes regarding the "five stages," while 
the most important point, as for example the peace treaty, would 
only begin at the third stage, whereas under the Soviet proposal 
peace treaty negotiations could be started at once: 
"The establishment of a provisional all-German govern- 
ment will mean that the democratic forces of Eastern and 
Western Germany can begin already today to work for the 
genuine unification of Germany. The Germans must take the 
preparation and holding of all-German elections into their 
own hands. Our four governments must both trust and sup  
port them." 
The charge made by Molotov at one point in the discussion 
that the Western intention was to extend the Bonn regime to all 
of Germany is bolstered by a report by J. Alvarez del Vayo in The 
Nation for February 13. Mr. del Vayo sought out the Bonn dele- 
gation headed by Dr. Blankenhorn (see page lo) at their West 
Berlin headquarters to get an indication of their way of thinking. 
He described them as ". . . veteran career men. I remember when 
some of them served under Hitler." Mr. del Vayo asked them 
whether they would consider the idea of a committee of West and 
East German experts to prepare elections, as an alternative to the 
Westen plan, and reported their answer: 
"Not a chance, they said They reject any idea of gttti~ 
the two Germanys on a footing of equalit).. They see 
fication of Germany as the simple absorpuon of East Germany 
by Bonn." 
Thus spoke the representatives of Adenauer, with whom the 
Western three had coordinated all their plans, and who were in 
West Berlin to see that there was no deviation from these plans. 
Mr. del Vayo also had a talk with Erich Ollenhauer, chairman 
of the Social Democratic Party, which has a large representation 
in the Bonn Parliament. The Socialist leader gave him a further 
insight into Adenauer's idea of free elections throughout Germany. 
From Ollenhauer, as Mr. del Vayo wrote in The Nation for Feb- 
ruary 20, he learned: 
"When the Socialists oppose Adenauer's policy on EDC and 
his demand that the whole of East Germany, now consisting 
of five Lander, be treated as a single Land in the plan for *future 
reunification, they follow their principles but also fight to save 
their awn skins. They see in this a new trick of the shrewd 
Chancellor to maintain himself in power indefinitely. An 
Anschluss of East Germany to the Federal Repu'blic under this 
scheme would insure Adenauer a majority in the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat to the end of his days, keeping the Socialists 
out of office and condemning them to the role of an eternal 
and sterile opposition." 
In his answer, turning down Mr. Molotov's proposal, Mr. 
Dulles charged that Mr. Molotov had rejected elections "be- 
cause he is afraid of them-he has reason to be." Mr. Molotov, of 
course, had not rejected elections, as he had just finished making 
quite clear. And if the Soviet Foreign Minister did fear the re- 
sults of an expression of the people's will, why had he suggested 
a national referendum to determine it, and for that matter, why 
was Mr. Dulles so unwilling to submit the Western and the Soviet 
plans to such a test? 
Mr. Dulles further charged that Mr. Molotov's intention was 
"a method of extending the solid Communist bloc to the Rhine." 
The Secretary of State argued that the exclusion of "monqhlist, ' 
militarist and fascist groups" is a "classical Communist concept i 
of elections." He seemed to have forgotten that it was also the , 
conmpt agreed to by the United States, British and French gov- 
ernments at the close of World War 11, brought on by those groups 
in Germany. Thus, again, he underlined the Administration's 
repudiation of the signature of the United States to the Yalta and 
Potsdam agreements. Mr. Dulles charged that the " 'so-called' ' 
Geman Democratic Republic was put in power and kept in ' 
power by Soviet power," and that it would have been "forcibly 
ejected from power by the workers, who in their desperation rose 
up against it last June, but for Soviet armed force." 
Mr. Molotov's answer to this last point was: 
"Some people do not like the regime of the German De'mo- 
cratic Republic. We do not like the regime of West Germany. 
But this is not the problem. 
"The events of June 17 have been mentioned here. We 
know that these events were arranged from without and that 
they were carried out by foreign hands. . . . These things have 
been taken into account in the German Democratic Republic 
and they could never be repeated. The reason they could 
never be repeated is that they have no ground under them." 
(This statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister finds confirma- 
tion in the complete failure of any of the provocative rumors cir- 
culated during the conference, about riots and troop movements 
in Eastern Gemany, to materialize.) 
Mr. Dulles concluded by saying that Mr. Molotov's words had 
led up to "the ending of any defense of Western Germany, its 
complete exposure to the vast forces that lie to the east." 
Mr. Dulles seems to have forgotten that it was Nazi Germany 
that invaded the Soviet Union and not vice versa. 
The Secretary of State was again echoed by M. Bidault in the 
latter's refusal to accept the legitimacy of the German Democratic 
Republic as holding any mandate from the people, though he did 
not seem concerned that he held no mandate from the people or 
the parliament of France in the position he had himself taken 
at the conference. He suggested that it would be quite impossible 
for the representatives of Bonn to sit down at the same table with 
the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, thereby 
in effect saying that Geman unification is altogether impossible. 
M. Bidault finally, however, suggested as an amendment to the 
Western election plan that commissions at each level might be 
made up of a representative of the East German Government and 
a representative of the West German Government and a neutral 
who would act as arbitrator. There was no indication, however, ! that this was advanced as a serious proposal. Mr. Eden seemed to feel that perhaps Mr. Dulles had gone 
n a little too far. He insisted that the sole purpose of proposing 
I "free elections" was to guard against Nazi revival. He said that his 
government was ready to prolong its twenty-year non-aggression 
- treaty with the Soviet Union, or to consider any other ways "in 
which we could help resolve the Soviet Union's anxiety about its 
security." 
But he supported the other arguments against the possibility 
of the two regimes in Germany reaching agreement. "I can imag- 
ine," he remarked, "there might be some difficulty over the allo- 
cation of portfolios." He went on: 
"We will never turn our defensive alliance into aggression 
against the Soviet Union. The basis of consent on whlch our 
action depends, the will of our parliaments, the peaceful pur- 
poses of our eoples, all make this utterly impossible. None P of us would c aim that parliamentary institutions are an abso- 
lute guarantee against aggressive policies. Certainly not. [Did 
some one in the wings whisper Greece-Kenya-Malaya-Burma 
-Guiana?] But as parliamentarians of some experience, we are 
entitled to say that you cannot in this day and age lead democ- 
racies into an aggressive war." 
Before concluding the discussions on the German question, Mr. 
Molotov proposed that all four m p y i n g  powers take steps to 
ease the economic position of Germany and create favorable con- 
ditions for the development of a peaceful economy and to im- 
prove the material position of the people. He reported that the 
Soviet Government, as of January 1, 1954, had stopped collecting 
reparations from the German Democratic Republic, handed over 
without requiring compensation all Soviet enterprises in Germany, 
and reduced occupation expenditures to a sum not exceeding five 
per cent of the budgetary revenues of the GDR. Beside this, the 
GDR had been freed from paying to the Soviet Union postwar 
national debts, including debts incurred under external occupa- 
tion expenditures since 1945. 
The Soviet Foreign Minister proposed that Western Germany 
be likewise freed of obligations. 
Mr. Dulles was very derisive about Mr. Molotov's concern for 
the economic welfare of the German Federal Republic, which, he 
said, had shown phenomenal economic improvement. In this con- 
nection Mr. Molotov commented later: 
"For some reason, however, he did not mention that the 
rise of industry in Eastern Germany has reached a higher level 
than in Western Germany. He did not mention the fact that 
the number of unemployed has reached two million in Western 
Germany and continues to increase. In Eastern Germany, how- 
ever, there is no unemployment. Mr. Dulles evaded our pro- 
posal for reduci occupation expenses, but this is an impor- 
tant question. W 3 y has it been possible in 1954 to reduce the 
occupation expenses of the German Democratic Republic to 4.5 
per cent of the budget revenue, while the occupation expenses 
in Western Germany have risen to 34.4 per cent and amount to 
9.6 billion marks?" 
Molotov Offers European Collective Security Plan 
In his final summation of the Soviet position on Gennany, 
Mr. Molotov said there had been no answer to Soviet proposals 
which offered real possibility of concluding a peace treaty with 
Germany this year. 
Answering the points raised about reconciling the viewpoints 
of the two German governments, he said, here at this table we have 
not only different regimes, but different peoples-why should not 
representatives of the same people be able to hold discussions? 
There are states in Europe today where Communists and non- 
communists participate in government-why not in Germany? 
He emphasized that his government was opposed to a military 
alliance for Germany with either the East or West. 
Mr. Molotov reminded the other three Foreign Ministers that 
the tasks of insuring European security had been connected with 
the German problem in the agenda. A military grouping like the 
EDC, of part of the European states opposed to others, could not, 
he said, strengthen security, but on the contrary increased the 
danger of war. 
Reviewing the recent history of Europe, Molotov showed how 
each time a military grouping had been set up another group ap- 
f peared in retaliation, and that such divisions had brought about 
the two world wars. 
He noted that it was the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed by Hit- 
lerite Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan, which had un- 
leashed the Second World War, and recalled the words of former 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to the effect that though ostensibly 
the pact had been concluded for self-defense against communism, 
actually it was a preparation for further measures of armed expan- 
sion by predatory states. The North Atlantic Pact, he said, in 
many respects resembles the Anti-Comintern Pact, since it is based 
on the idea of setting up groups opposed primarily to the Soviet 
Union and the People's Democracies, and the North Atlantic bloc 
of powers, headed by the United States and Great Britain, are 
pushing forward plans for creating military groups in Europe, in 
Asia, in the Pacific, as well as in the Near and Middle East. 
He asked how the plans for setting up the EDC can provide 
guarantees for the security of Europe as M. Bidault, Mr. Eden and 
n Mr. Dulles had insisted: 
"Since Western Germany disposes of the greatest military- 
industrial and man wer resources, German militarism will r ' play a dominant ro e in the 'European Defense Community.' 
Thus, by tying security guarantees for the Soviet Union with 
the creation of the 'European Defense Community,' the West- 
ern Powers are placing the role of security guarantor upon 
German militarism, a revival of which constitutes precisely 
the chief menace to European security." 
And how, he asked, as partners of a remilitarized Western 
Germany, could the United States and Britain be the guarantors 
of the security of the Soviet Union against attack by German 
. militarism? 
The question had been raised that there was no alternative 
' 
to EDC. As an alternative, Mr. Molotov declared, there could be 
a plan providing for the collective security of all the peoples of 
tov referred to the inter-American treaty of mutual 
assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, by the United 
States and all the Latin American Republics. If there could be 
such an inter-American treaty, why not a European collective secur- 
Mr. Molotov then formally submitted the proposal of the So- 
viet Government "On Safeguarding Security in Europe." 
1. While the proposed 50-year collective security pact for all the 
countries of Europe was widely reported, there was complete si- 
lence on the preliminary steps proposed by the Soviet delegation 
to prepare the way for such a pact, although these were of far- 
reaching importance, represented an entirely fresh approach, and 
were a vital part of the proposal. 
First of all, recognizing the difficulties of reaching agreement 
on the German question at this time, Molotov proposed that the 
: Four Powers should not drop the problem at the conclusion of 
the conference, but should continue their efforts to reach a peace- 
Then came the new and startling proposal-that occufxztion 
troops of the Four Powers be withdrawn six months from now. 
This proposal means the withdrawal of occupation troops 
before $ere is a peace treaty and peaceful unification, while the 
efforts to achieve them continues. Previous Soviet proposals had 
been for the withdrawal of such forces only within a year of the 
conclusion of the peace treaty. 
Recognizing that there will still be many complicated prob- 
lems between the two parts of Germany and among the Four 
Powers, the proposal suggested that only limited contingents of 
agreed-upon strength remain, with no occupation duties, but to 
perform protective functions arising from the control tasks of 
each of the Four Powers which must inevitably be continued 
until the peace treaty is concluded. Each of the Four Powers would 
have the right to move in their forces in case security in either 
part is threatened, the USSR in relation to Eastern Germany, the 
other three powers in relation to Western Germany. 
The German Democratic Republic and the German Federal 
Republic would have their own police units for maintaining in- 
ternal order and defense of frontiers, their number and arms to 
be determined by agreement among the Four Powers. 
With these measures undertaken to insure the neutralization 
of Germany and to create better conditions for the settlement of 
the German problem, the Soviet delegation proposed that the 
Four Powers should take the initiative in convening a conference 
of all European states to consider the conclusion of a treaty on 
collective security, with appropriate guarantees against aggres- 
sion. 
It becomes clear on studying the above proposal why it was sup- 
pressed by the press, and apparently almost completely ignored in 
the conference discussions. Wide dissemination of this proposal 
would be too embarrassing a refutation of the charge of the West- 
ern powers that the Soviet Union is not anxious for a settlement 
in Germany, wants to "hold on to Eastern Germany," and to keep 
its occupation troops there indefinitely. 
The second part of the Soviet proposal outlined the Soviet plan 
to end the division of Europe into two hostile camps and create 
an all-inclusive Collective Security System. The draft offered by 
Molotov for A General European Treaty on Collective Security, 
contained ten points, which we give in slightly condensed form. 
1. The treaty to be open to all European states. After uni- 
fication, the united German state to be a party, pending 
that time, the German Democratic Republic and the Ger- 
man Federal Re ublic to be parties, enjoying equal rights. 
2. The parties un f ertake to refrain from any attack against 
one another, from threat or use of force, and, in accord- 
ance with the UN Charter, to settle any dispute by peace- 
ful means. 
3. The parties shall consult whenever danger of armed at- 
tack against one or more, in view of any one of them, 
shall arise, in order to take steps to remove the danger. 
4. An armed attack in Europe against any one or more shall 
be considered an attack against all, and each shall assist 
with every means in its power including armed force. 
5. Procedures for such collective efforts to be considered and 
determined at an early date. 
6. Information on activities undertaken or contemplated in 
exercise of the right of self-defense or maintaining peace 
in Europe to be sent immediately to the Security Council 
in conformity with UN Charter provisions. 
7. The arties undertake not to participate in any coalition 
or alfiance or conclude any agreement, the purposes of 
which would contradict the purposes of the treaty. 
8. Periodical and when necessary special conferences of rep- 
resentatives of all parties to be held; a permanent con- 
sultative political committee, and a military consultative 
body to be set up. 
g. Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, the parties shall in- 
vite the governments of the United States and the People's 
Republic of China to send their representatives to bodies 
set up under the treaty, as observers. 
10. This treaty not to impair in any way obligations in inter- 
national treaties and agreements among European states 
whose principles and purposes are in conformity with its 
princi les and purposes. B 11. The uration of the treaty shall be 50 years. - - 
I ,'&I. L 
Mr. Dulles promptly rejected out-of-hand the serious and care- 
fully thought-out Soviet proposals for a European Security Treaty, 
and ridiculed the idea that there should be another conference to 
discuss this issue. He remarked that he assumed the collective 
security treaty would be in reality a replacement of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and then he continued with a fine air of magna- 
nimity: 
"The United States certainly cannot take offense at the sug- 
gestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European 
countries should get together for their own collective security 
without the participation of the United States. The United 
States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted partic- 
ipant in European affairs, and we do not have any intention 
of doing so in the future." . - .-; yrr- 1 1  
The Secretary of State declared that it was hot the United 
States but the Soviet Union that had caused the present division 
in Europe: f 
"It is a division between those who have not been absorbed 
and the others who do not want to be absorbed. Whether or not 
the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in 
Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be con- 
sidered by other states than the United States. So far as the 
United States is concerned, we are determined that we will 
not be absorbed." 
Both Mr. Eden and M. Bidault also rejected the proposal, de- 
claring that the Atlantic Alliance and United States aid to Europe 
were a vital part of the life of the West. Mr. Eden described the 
plan as a "modern Monroe Doctrine" to break up NATO and 
keep the United States out of Europe. (Some wondered why, in- 
deed, Europe should not have its own Monroe Doctrine.) When 
references were made to the blood and treasure spent by the Ameri- 
cans in Europe, Mr. Molotov expressed the gratitude of the Soviet 
people for the aid of the United States in World War 11. With 
reference to the objections about excluding the United States, he 
reminded the others that the United States is also excluded from 
EDC, to which it is not committed to supply troops. 
Mr. Molotov indicated that while the EDC itself was incom- 
patible with his collective security proposal, the question of wheth- 
er it would mean the replacement of the North Atlantic Alliance 
was subject to consideration. 
Mr. Molotov urgently sought a real discussion on the substance 
of his proposals, indicating there was nothing hard and fast about 
them, and they were subject to revision. But the others were not 
eager to pursue the argument. 
Meager press comments on reactions in Europe (largely blacked 
out by the press in the course of the conference) showed that a tre- 
mendous impact had been made by the Soviet proposals. 
Don Cook in the New York Herald Tribune, February 1 I ,  called 
it "a major Russian diplomatic move of the post-war period." 
Clifton Daniel wrote in the New York Times the same day 
that many Berlin observers considered the Soviet security program 
"the most important Soviet diplomatic move in years." 
The Paris newspapers Combat and Le Monde were reported 
as suggesting that "the idea deserves serious consideration." 
The Munchester Guardian of February 11, according to Drew 
Middleton in the New York Times of February 12, "differed from 
the official position of the Foreign Office to suggest that the pro- 
posals put forward yesterday by Viacheslav Molotov . . . should not 
be rejected without careful thought." The dispatch reported that 
a similar view was expressed by some Members of Parliament. 
Before the conference closed, Mr. Molotov, in order that ef- 
' 1.. ' .r 
forts for German unification be continued, proposed on February 
17 that the Big Four take steps enabling th; dermans themselves 
p to work out methods of cooperation between East and West Ger- 
many. To this end he suggested: a :--=I , 1.- The establishment of an all-German committee on com- b inemal, transportation, economic payments and frontier questions. 1 
P. The establishment of a separate committee to develop cul- 
tural, scientific and sports relations between the two sections of 
Germany. 
In the course of the discussions Secretary Dulles had made 
charges to the effect that there exists a much larger police force 
proportionately to the population in Eastern Germany than in 
Western Germany, and that they in fact represented armed con- 
tingents. Mr. Molotov on his part cited figures reported to him 
of the West German police and border forces and their armaments, 
as well as the number of German soldiers attached to them. The 
Western representatives had given contradictory figures in their 
replies. 
To clear up this matter, Molotov proposed that the four gov- 
ernments ascertain the actual strength of the police forces in both 
sections of Germany, and reach an agreement on what the strength 
of all types of police should be, and the extent of the armaments 
they should be permitted to have. 
This proposal was turned down. 
The Western Powers also rejected the idea of all-German com- 
mittees for the purposes suggested, indicating their preference for 
such matters to be handled by the High Commissioners of the 
Four Powers in Germany, rather than by the German people 
themselves. 
-1 m 
i T h e  Question of Austria 
Drscussro~ OF AGENDA ITEM 3: The 
Austrian State Treaty. 
'I: hR DULLES, Mr. Eden and M. Bidault had agreed in advance 
! that an invitation should be extended to Herr Leopold Figl, Aus- 
I trian Foreign Minister, to participate in the Berlin Conference when the question of Austria was discussed. Mr. Molotov had 
readily agreed to this, regretting only that the same privilege had 
not been accorded to representatives of the Western and Eastern 
: German governments. 
After Herr Fig1 had made his opening statement regarding the 
importance to his country of regaining its independence and con- 
cluding a peace treaty, Mr. Molotov welmmtd his presence at tht 
conference, and said that the Soviet Union also attaches great im- 
portance to the conclusion of the treaty with Austria and the 
establishment of Austria as a free and independent state. He at 
once agreed to Herr Figl's request that payment for former German 
assets in Austria be made in goods instead of dollars. 
Referring to the lengthy negotiations which had already been 
held over the treaty, Mr. Molotov declared that a major obstacle 
to completing the draft of the Austrian treaty was the fact that the 
United States and Britain had failed to fulfill their obligations 
with regard to the Free Territory of Trieste assumed under the 
peace treaty with Italy, and had actually turned the Territo~y of 
Trieste into an Anglo-American military base. This could not be 
overlooked by the Soviet Union which was concerned with pre- 
venting the same thing from happening in Austria. 
Another cause of delay had been the separate submission in 
lgrjn by the other Three Powers of the draft of an "abbreviated 
treaty" with Austria, which ran counter to previously agreed-upon 
decisions, ignoring the question of the democratic rights of the 
Austrian people-almost two years having passed before this ab- 
breviated treaty was withdrawn. 
Mr. Molotov then made clear why the Soviet Union has all 
along taken the position that a satisfactory settlement for Austria 
is dependent on a peaceful settlement for Germany. 
Asserting that the USSR believes there is every possibility for 
reestablishing Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic 
state, and for freeing Austria from Four Power control, Molotov 
said that there must be safeguards; that it was necessary to include 
in the Austrian Treaty an article preventing Austria from being 
drawn into any military alliance directed against any country whose 
armed forces took part in repelling Nazi aggression and in liberat- 
ing Austria. This, he said, was bound up with the remilitarization 
of Germany and the EDC. 
We cannot forget, he reminded the conference, that German 
militarism previously began with drawing Austria into military 
blocs directed against other European peoples, using Austria's man- 
power and material resources for the aggressive purposes of Ger- 
man militarism. This was done through Anschluss (an actual 
annexation bringing Austria completely under German domina- 
tion) before the last World War, and any new attempts at An- 
schluss must be prevented. 
Yet today, he continued, statements of press organs close to 
the government of Western Germany and official spokesmen "ad- 
vocate the ill-intentioned idea that Austria cannot exist indepen- 
dently and that she must be subordinated to Western Germany," 
and "West German monopolies are already carrying out certain 
measures aimed at the\ gradual economic subordination of Aus- 
tria." These plans, nurtured by West German militarists and 
revanchists art!- also, Molotov asserted, supported by certain rep 
resentatives of Austria's governing circles. 'mm 
Conclusion of a pea& treaty with Gamany would, he said, 
be the best guarantee against this. But since this question was un- 
settled, it was necessary for the Four Powers to take measures in 
connection with the sealement of the Austrian question to prevent 
Anschluss and insure Austria's independence. He added: 
"The Soviet Government believes that all such measures will 
become unnecessary and superfluous as soon as a peace treaty with 
Germany is concluded." 
Mr. Molotov proposed, therefore, that Deputy Foreign Ministers 
be instructed to prepare within three months a final draft of the 
treaty previously agreed in the main, in "conformity with which 
Austria shall be restored as a sovereign independent and demo- 
cratic state, shall be released from the control of the Four Powers, 
while the existing machinery of control-the Allied Commission for 
Austria and all its agencies-shall be abolished and the occupa- 
tion of Austria shall terminate, adding to-this that Austria would 
pledge not to take part in any military alliance or allow foreign 
military bases or instructors on its territory." 
For the purpose of preventing new Anschluss, Mr. Molotov 
proposed postponing the complete withdrawal of troops of the 
Four Powers stationed on the territory of the respective zones in 
Austria until a German peace treaty is concluded; all foreign 
forces to be withdrawn from Vienna with the abolition of the 
Control Commission; the forces of the Four Powers temporarily 
remaining not to be occupation forces, and not to interfere in af- 
fairs of Austrian Administration or in the country's social and po- 
litical life. He proposed also that the Deputy Ministers be in- 
structed to examine the question of Trieste in connection with the 
Soviet proposal that it not be used as a military base. 
It should be clearly understood that in this proposal Mr. Molo* 
tov was asking that there be guarantees against Austria joining 
any military alliance of either the Eastern or the Western powers, 
and that limited contingents of the Four Powers remaining until 
the conclusion of the peace treaty were to have no occupation func- 
tions whatever, but only defensive functions against German an- 
nexationist aims that had to be guarded against as long as the re- 
militarization of Gemany continued. 
The k e e  Western countries who, it will be remembered, had 
insisted on the continued occupation of Germany until m e  rather 
distant date, according to the five stages of their own plan, and 
the presence of foreign troops on its soil for 50 years under EDC, 
now reversed all their arguments in relation to Austria. 
Secretary Dulles said Mr. Molotov's statement had given him 
"a cold chill." 
Referring to what he called the "poisonous proposals" of Mr. 
Molotov, he said they would turn the clock back "to the darker 
earlier period when by Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly 
doomed to be forever the victim of alien occupation," although 
it was exactly the prevention of such a situation that Mr. Molotov 
had in mind. Mr. Dulles said that since the Soviet Union "was 
responsible for blocking German unification," its proposal "would 
mean the indefinite occupation of Austria, and that "by requiring 
the withdrawal of all Allied troops from Vienna, while retaining 
Soviet forces in the Soviet zone, the capital of Austria would thus 
be left as a defenseless island surrounded by a sea of Russian sol- 
diers," (quite ignoring the fact that Mr. Molotov had also pro- 
posed that limited troops of the other Powers remain in their 
zones). Mr. Dulles declared that if the Soviet proposal were ac- 
cepted "there would be not a free Austria but an enslaved Aus- 
tria." 
After emphatic comments from Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and 
M. Bidault to the effect that a country could not be considered 
independent with foreign military units on its soil, Mr. Molotov 
made the following statement: 
"We have been told that if some military units remain in 
Austria it is equal to occupation. He who argues in such a way 
must answer the following question. The United States of Amer- 
ica has eight military bases in France. What is this? Is it an 
occupation? In Italy it has several bases. In Greece, three bases, 
and also bases in Norway and Iceland. What is this? Is this an 
occupation? No one says this is an occupation. But truly 
this is a liinitation of sovereignty. 
"If the Four Powers reach agreement on the stay of some 
limited troop contingents in Austria, it means no occupation 
but a certain limitation of sovereignty dictated by necessities. 
"Approximately loo American bases have been established 
on or near European territory. We have to take interest in this 
as we are here concerned about the security of our country and 
other peace-loving nations. The European Defense Community, 
which results in a birth of militarism in West Germany, has 
been created. 
"If the United States, France and Great Britain would write 
off creation of the EDC, if they would write off revival of mili- 
tarism in West Germany, the situation would become easier. . . ." 
Mr. Molotov said that the proposal' of' the 'Soviet delegation 
would not, of course, solve the problem loo pa cent, but it had 
been put forward as a temporary measure pending a satisfactory 
solution to the German question which would prevent nmilitariza- 
tion, and that it at least represented a practical step toward an early 
solution of the Austrian question. 
Herr Figl, of course, was anxious to have the question of the 
peace treaty settled, and did not welcome the idea of any foreign 
troops remaining in Austria. However, press reports showed that 
his rejection was much less categorical than that of Mr. Dulles, 
and had it not been for pressure £rom the West, the Austrian Gov- 
ernment might well have been ready to accept an interim solution 
that represented a long advance over the present rimation, toward 
complete independence. 
In the course of the discussion Mr. Molotov made several con- 
cessions. He offered return of the German assets held by the Soviet 
Union in Austria "this very day." In view of Western offers to 
agree to Russian versions of certain disputed points, he withdrew 
his proposal that the Deputy Foreign Ministers take up considera- 
tion of the treaty where they left off last year. He abandoned his 
condition linking Trieste with the Austrian treaty, proposing that 
the Big Four refer this question to the United Nations Security 
Council. He suggested that the point on limited troop contingents 
might be reformulated, that it should be agreed to bring the matter 
up for reconsideration in 1955. 
The three Western powers, during the subsequent discussions. 
hurried through an acceptance of all the remaining points in the 
previous draft treaty which they had previously been reluctant to 
accept, even those points particularly urged by the Swiet Union. 
When Molotov was now told that since all the requirements 
previously raised by the Soviet Union with regard to the treaty had 
been met he should be prepared to sign it, he reminded the others 
' that the situation had changed since the draft treaty had originally 
been drawn up, and that since that time plans for the remilitariza- 
tion of Germany and the EDC had gone forward. The Soviet For- 
eign Minister agreed to sign if his proposals for limited foreign 
: troops pending the conclusion of the Geman peace treaty. and the 
guarantees against Austria joining any military alliances were qc- 
cepted. As the other three powers refused to accept the new soviet 
proposals even in modified form, the matter was left there. 
h 
The Conference Ends 
ON FEBRUARY 18, the final day of the conference, the com- 
munique was issued announcing that agreement had been reached 
on the holding of a conference with the Chinese People's Republic 
at Geneva on April 26: (See page 53) 
The important thing was that the pressure of the people of the 
world, their longing for a peaceful settle'ment in Korea, for an end 
to the fighting in Indo-China, and for further efforts at agreement 
among the Big Powers, had compelled those who were reluctant 
to have further conferences, to continue their negotiations, and that 
the realities of the situation had compelled a recognition of the fact 
that the 500,000,000 people of China had to be represented at 
negotiations. 3, ..R 
In his final words, Secretary of State Dulles expressed regret that 
the conference had failed to satisfy the hopes of so many through- 
out the world. He declared that the failures were not due to lack 
of effort, but to "a fundamental difference between the views of 
the East and the West. . . ." "All our differences," he said, "have 
revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed 
safe, to give man and nations a genuine freedom of choice. The 
Western Powers were willing to place trust in the German and 
Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not." He blamed the 
Soviet Union for failure to achieve the unification of Germany: 
"Our discussion of European securit has revealed that the 
Soviet Union believes that its security d epends upon maintain- 
ipg such a huge preponderance of power that every other coun- 
try of Europe will in fact be subject to its coercion." 
(How strangely similar to words with which Dulles has at other 
thnes and places described American foreign policy!) 
Mr. Dulles acknowledged that positive results had been achieved 
in the arrangements to hold the Korean political conference and 
to discuss the restoration of peace in Indo-China, and in the deci- 
sion to pursue the search for agreement on arms reduction. He said: 
"In addition to what we have done here, we have learned 
much that has a value which is not to be ignored. I t  makes it 
less likely that any of us should by inadvertence or miscalcula- 
tion do what would risk another world war." 
If that indeed has been accomplished, no single more important 
result could have emerged from the conference, although Mr. Dul- 
les rather spoiled the effect by insisting that the Western nations 
would go right on with their plans for "what strengthens freedom," 
(read EDC and rearming Germany). 
The Secretary of State concluded: 
"I thank each of my three colleagues for the clarity and can- 
dor of their artici ation in this conference and for the uniform 
courtesy an $ consi i! eration which each has shown me." 
The Soviet Foreign Minister opened his final statement with the 
comment that the conference had led to a better understanding of 
the positions and differenas of the nations npnsented and of ways 
to lessen these differences. 
Mr. Molotov noted that agreement had been reached to take 
steps toward a fair solution of the question of disarmament, or at 
least a considerable reduction in armaments. 
He termed the decision on a conference to discuss a final set- 
tlement of the Korean question and of the restoration of peace in 
Indochina as a contribution to strengthening peace. 
He felt that the discussions of the German problem had shown 
that a solution of this question is inseparably bound up with the 
problem of security in Europe, and that this meant Germany must 
be reunified on a democratic and peaceful basis, with no revival 
of militarism permitted; that the conference made dear that the 
solution of the-~errnan problem is a matter for the German people 
themselves and the Soviet representatives were convinced that if 
they had been heard it would have been easier to find a solution. 
He expressed the hope that efforts for a peace treaty and peaceful 
unification of Germany would be continued by the Four Powers. 
Without entering into recriminations as io where the respon- 
sibility for failure on the questions of Germany and Austria lay, 
Mr. Molotov declared: 
"The Soviet Government has never made a secret about its 
rejection of the creation of military groups of these or those 
countries directed against other states. The Soviet Government 
cannot help pointing out the particular dangers of such a mili- 
tary group as the European Defense Community, formation of 
which means the rebirth of German militarism." 
It was for this reason, he said, the Soviet Union had submitted 
its proposals for an all-European treaty of collective security, which 
non-European states could help to bring about. He felt that the 
Austr$an question could have been solved. 
In conclusion, the Soviet Foreign Minister said the following: 
"The conference contributed to the discsusion of some inter- 
national roblems, the solution of which is necessary for the 
further re i' axation of international tension. The problems which 
could not be solved at the Berlin Conference are not wiped off 
the agenda. 
"The Berlin Conference, we hope, will contribute to the 
development of cooperation of nations in international relations 
in the interests of the strengthening of peace." 
Mr. Molotov expressed the gratitude of the Soviet delegation 
for the cooperation of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, 
France and Britain at the conference. He also thanked all the staff 
members of the four 'delegations for their good and speedy work 
during the conference. 
On the day following the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, 
the three Western Powers, the United States, Great Britain and 
France, following their usual custom, issued their own special com- 
munique. They did not even mention the most important achieve- 
ment of the conference-the agreement on a conference at Geneva, 
including the Chinese People's Republic. They laid the entire 
blame for failure to reach agreement on questions of German reuni- 
fication and an Austrian treaty at the door of the Soviet Union. The 
' communique declared: "The Three Powers do not intend to be 
deflected from their efforts to develop the system of defense on 
which their survival depends" (i.e., the European Defense Corn- 
muni ty .) 
In a statement summing up the results of the Berlin Conference 
published in the Moscow Pravda on March 5,  Foreign Minister 
Molotov emphasized again the Soviet position that the settlement 
of the German problem now hinges on the fundamental problem: 
"to revive or not to revive German militarism." Stressing the con- 
sistent adherence of the Soviet Government to the principle of 
peaceful c~xis tence of states with different social systems, he wrote: 
"We believe that despite the difference in the social systems 
of the European countries, for exam le, all the European peo- 
ples are interested in preserving anBstrengthening peace. We 
wish that in the question of safeguarding peace there should be 
no two camps in Europe as well as throughout the world. We 
call upon the European states to abandon the creation of mili- 
tary groups op sed to each other, since the creation of such 
oups cannot K t  lead to war. Instead we propose the estab- 
Riament of a simple corn* of all European states striving to 
safeguard their security and strengthen peace in Europe. In this 
system of European security no state, even a strong one, should 
I 
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hold a dominant position. The sovereignty of each knd every 
! 1 one of the participants of this collective security system should 
be ensured and safeguarded against any external encroach- -' ments. . . :* 
I 
The Soviet Foreign Minister declarcd that the results of the 
Berlin Conference should not be over-estimated, and would become 
more clear only as a result of the Geneva Conference. The impor- 
tant point, he said, was that the long break in Great Power confer- 
ences had come to an end, that a number of questions had been 
clarified, and that the Berlin Conference paved the way to a con- 
ference that would include the People's Republic of China and 
other powers, as well as those who had met in Berlin. He stressed 
the determination of the Soviet Government to continue its efforts 
to ;educe international tensions and strengthen peace. 
 the door to continuing negotiations is open. It  is our duty as 
Americans to do our part to see that it is never closed. Through it 
lies the only way to peace for America and for the world. 
Communique 
On the Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers 
of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and France. 
I 1 . 7 '  
= The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the 
1 1  Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, John Foster Dulles, 
' / ' Viacheslav M. Molotov, Anthony Eden and George Bidault, took 
place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954. They 
reached the following agreements: 
A. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France, meet- 
ing in Berlin, 
I Considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a 
united and independent Korea would be an important factor in 
reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts 
1 - Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, 
France, the People's Republic of China, the Re ublic of Korea, 
the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, an% other countries 
whose armed forces participated in the hostilities in Korea and 
which desh to attend shall meet in Geneva on April 26, 1954 for 
the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question, 
Agree that the problem of restoring pace in IndoChina will 
also be discussed at the conference to which representatives of the 
United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. the United 
T m ,  France, the Peo le's Republic of China, and other inter- 
a t e  states will be invitecf 
I t  is understood that neither the invitation to nor the holding 
of the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplo- 
matic recognition in any case where it has not already been 
accorded, 
B. The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet 
Sodalist Republics, the United Kingdom and France. 
Convinced that the solution of international controversies nec- 
-7 for the establishment of lasting peace would be considerably aide by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial 
reduction of armaments, 
Will subseq.uently hold an exchange of views to promote the 
successful solutlon of this problem as provided for in Paragraph 6 
of the United Nations Resolution of November PS, 1953, 
The four ministers have had a full exchange of views on the 
German question, on the problems of European security and on 
the Austr~an question, but they were unable to reach agreement on 
these matters. 
Sources a d  Credits 
We have used for our sources the daily New York press, chiefly the New York 
Times and New York Herald Tribune, certain American periodicals such as the 
liberal weekly, The Nation, and the reactionary US. News and World Refmrt, 
diapatches from the National Guardian correspondent, George Wheeler, and the 
Soviet press and periodicals which gave wide coverage to the wnference and 
provided the complete texts of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's main addresses 
and proposals. 
Material on the various treaties described in the glossary was drawn from 
the annual yearbooks of the Encyclopedia Britannia, the press, and New World 
Review. 
Special thanks are due to Margrit Adler, Editor of the German-American, for 
preparation of the material on the two German governments, and to Andrew 
Voynuw, Managing Editor of New World Rmiew, for his indispensable assistance 
in the editing and preparation of the pamphlet. 
APPENDIX fThe Two German Governments 
In the course of the Berlin discussion on Ger- 
many, the Western Powers made frequent charges 
to the eflect that the Federal Republic of Bonn, in 
the West, is truly representative of the people of 
Germany, while the German Demomtic Republic 
in the East is not. So that readers may draw their 
own coficlusions ma this and other aspects of the 
discussions on Germany, we are giving certain data 
about the two regimes. S w e  limitations prewent 
adequate treatment of the manifold developments 
of post-war Germany, but this material will s u m  
to rndicate main policies and trends. 
German Federal Republic 
Area 94,705 square miles 
Population q 8 ~ 7 8 m  (1959) 
Founded May ng, lgqg (effective Sept. 
1, '949) 
Before the ink dried on the Pots- 
dam agreement, preparations were 
made to boycott its application in the 
western occupation zones of Germany. 
Alt the London Foreign Ministers 
Conference this was realized. The 
delegates of (the United States, Great 
Britain and France rejected any pro- 
posal that would have saved German 
unity. On Dec. 40, 1947 the N t u  York 
Herald Tribune wrote: "The division 
of Germany will give us a free hand 
to include West Germany in a system 
of Western states.'' 
Under the separate West German 
Government set up at Bonn under 
Western auspices, the Potsdam agree- 
ment on decarteliza tion was abrogated. 
The Krupp h n  and steel empire haa 
been revived, the big industrialists who 
financed Hitler are back in power, 
the Ruhr b being restored as a base 
for war industries. 
American capital had an enormous 
share in German industry. In 1951 the 
Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut in Ber- 
lin estimated American participation 
in the German -economy at I .4 anillfan 
marks. The actual influence of US. 
capital is estimated at twice that sum. 
According to a recent estimate of 
the Infomtionsdicnst Ruhr, no per 
cent of all industrial enterprises in the 
Ruhr are in foreign hands, the major- 
ity of which are controlled by Awri- 
can firms. 
It is generally acknowledged that 
denazification was never carried out 
in Western Gemany and that d- 
fication is a fact. This was the inevita- 
ble result of the decision to rearm 
Western Germany and recreate it aa 
a "bulwark against communism," fol- 
laving Hitler'r own pmgram. Major 
Nazi war criminals have been released 
and hold high positions. 
Former Nazi Party tnembers have a 
majority of jobs in @he Bonn foreign 
ministry. Dr. Peter Pfeiffer, former 
Nazi, was appointed to qmmt  the 
Federal Republic as UN observer. 
Among the members of parliament's 
"European Defense Community Com- 
mittee," which rightfully should ~bc 
called "Committee on Armed Snvices," 
are Hitla's ex-admiral, Hellmuth 
Guido Alexander Heye, a - p e r a l  
Hasso von Manteuffel and Hitler's 
excolonel, Alfred Burghmister. Such 
examples could be multiplied mani- 
fold. 
military organizations and veterans' 
organizations are reviving the Nazi 
spirit; periodicals and boob glorifying 
militarization are pouring from the '1 
The New York Times of Jan. 17, 
1954 wrote: "An examination of the 
files of the Nazi party here (in Ber- 
lin) shows that four of the eightem 
cabinet members in Bonn were actual 
members of the party. . . ." 
Waldemar Kraft, Minister without 
Portfolio, was a Major in the SS and 
guilty of war crimes in Poland; Vik- 
tor Emmanuel Preusker, Minister of 
Housing, former member of the SS, 
and instructor in racial questions for 
that organization; Gerhard Schroeder, 
Minister of the Interior, joined the 
Nazi party in 1933, is now on the 
All pretense of demilitarization has Board the Hap- - long abandoned. The corn--  found^ and lekl  
rive London Economist wrote recently: the "North West German Foundq 
he backgmund of Dr. and Mining Federation," owned by the 
right wing coalition partners are gen- K1oeckner One of West Ger- 
erals who belime [that the Nazi New m a n ~ ' ~  patest industrial un- 
Europun Order and the v i ~ n g  Divi- dertakings: Robert Tillmanns, Minis- 
sion & the waffen = were the w e b  ter without Portfolio, had been sen- 
for the anti-Communist Europe of t' *en years 
tomorrow." by a U.S. court at  Nuremberg in 1947 
W i h  h e  p-ng of the m&tu- War charges; Pram BlucCha, 
tional desring the way for Minister for Economic Cooperation, 
co-iption and open rearmament on Was lo 7 yam i m p r h n m t  
Feb. 86, 1954, "h Theador Blank an M i l i m ~  w r t ;  he 
o m ; ,  unoffidal wnr min- now chairman of the Free Democratic 
istry, came into its own. Party. 
Even before the September elections 
which gave Adenauer a majority in M n g  S-dc~ds 
the Bundestag, this office had grown 
to be the largest ministry of the Bonn According to a study by the Trade 
government with g ~ o  employees. Even Union Institute of Economics in Co- 
Wore the conscription law was passed, logne, in June 1948, 83 per cent of the 
. 70,000 Germans were under arms in national income was in wages and 
the British zone as members of a salaries, 17 per cent in profits. By 
"German Service Organization" and December ~ggo, )the relationship had 
60,000 in a similar organization in the changed to 35 per cent of the income 
American zone, called "Industrial Po- in wages and salaries, 65 per cent 
lice." These battalions wntain up to profits. In January-February 1951, 
85 per cent of former SS officers and 8n.6 per cent of the taxes were paid 
men. by workers, 17.4 per cent by employ- 
Throughout Western Germany, 580 ers. 
According to a report issued by the 
Social Democratic Party of West Ger- 
many in September, 1958, cxwt of food, 
clothing and household goods has in- 
creased by 50 to loo per cent during 
Adenauer's regime, while wages have 
increased only lo ,per cent since 1951. 
Regarding unemployment, varied es- 
timates average around x,ooom. 
Elections, Sept. 6, 1953 
In ,these elections the Bundestag- 
lower house of the West German par- 
liament-was elected and ,the rule of 
Dr. Adenauer was at stake. 
The U.S. Government, through 
President Eisenhower's letter to Dr. 
Adenauer and John Foster Dulles* 
I 
election speech on the eve of the vot- 
ing, openly intervened on Adenauer's 
behalf. 
The forces behind Adenauer can be 
recognized in the following list of 
campaign contributions published on 
April 98, 1958 in the conservative 
Munich weekly Die Deutsche Woche: 
From banks and industrial enter- 
prises, 8 million German marlcs; - 
funds of the Catholic Church, 1.5 
million; from elections funds of the 
Federal Government, o million; from 
US. High-Commission sources. 6 mil- 
lion German marks. 
Tens of millions of marks were given 
by Krupp and other industrialists. 
Adenauer won a clear majority in 
the Bundestag and the total o p p i .  
tion won only 8,800,000 votes. Who 
really won the elections can best be 
demonstrated by the stock quotations 
in the table below. 
I 
Contributing to Adenauer's victory 
were election regulations, heavily fa- 
voring the -majority parties and depriv- 
ing parties with less than 5 per cent 
of the total vote of seats in the Bunde- 
I 
l l .  
stag. Neo-Naxi gfot@f'-b*rted Aden- 
aua.  
The West German police carried on 
a relentless campaign of intimidation 
during !the pre-election period. Thou- 
sands of opposition election workers 
were jailed, election material confis- 
cated and meetings prohibited. 
West German Peace Forces 
The strong sentiment for peace rep- 
resents a strong obstacle to Adenauer's 
goal of remilitarization of the German 
people. I 
In a recent poll of young people, 
by a West German public opinion 
research organization in Bielegfeld, 
British Zone, "Emnid," to the ques- 
tion, "Would you like to be a sol- 
diery 71 per cent answered NO; a8 
per cmt answered YES; i per cent had 
no opinion. 
Numerous trade union meetings 
have opposed steps for the remilitari- 
zation of Germany and the conscrip- 
#tion of the youth. Thousands of 
women froan all parts of Western Ger- 
many pmtested the constitutional 
changes allowing conscription. 
During the Berlin Conference, peo- 
ple in all Germany spoke out for Ger- 
man participation, and for a peaceful 
settlement of the German problem. 
In all Catholic Churches in West Ger- 
many an appeal by the Conference of 
Catholic Bishops in Fulda was read, 
bidding all Christians to pray for 
peace and unity. In the German 
Democratic Republic more than g 
million people signed an appeal to 
the Conference for peaceful unifica- 
tion. Despite repressions against the 
peace form in the West, an estimated 
3 million people from Wmt Germany 
appealed directly to the Berlin Con- 
ference. 
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llPIc Weat German pcra movement, 
as yet, is not unified. But nearly g mil- 
lion voters spoke against the Adenauer 
Governanent in the elections last Sep- 
tember, while further millions desir- 
ing peace were undoubtedly fooled 
by AdenauaVs demagogy during the 
election campaign, expoad b e d i -  
ately after by his appeal for forcible 
unification. Pretensions to democracy 
were atposed by Adenauer's attempts 
to impme government control on the 
trade unions. 
M a t  important forces in the peace 
movement in Western Gumany are: 
Fairly large seaions of the clergy, 
most prominent of whom is Pastor 
Martin Niemoeller; the rank and file 
of the Social Democratic Party; the 
Communist Party; the Federation of 
Victims of the Nazi Regime; League 
of Germans, led by former chancellor 
Dr. Joseph Wirth and Dr. Wilhelm 
Elfes; All German Peoples' Party, led 
by Dr. Gustav Heinemann, former 
Minister of the Interior in the Aden- 
auer Government and Helene Wessel, 
leading member of the Center Party. 
German Democratic Republic 
Area 44,110 square miles 
Population 17,313,700 (1949) 
Founded October 7, lgqg 
part of the People's Owned sector of 
industry, which today accounts for 
84 per cent of production. 
The German Democratic Republic. After the sumndap membcra of 
it should be noted, was not set up as the Nazi party* war aiminals a d  
a separate gowmment in eastern Nazi activists hod to undergo de-nd-  
many until more than four months fiation prom din^* War 
after #the Federal Government had b m  were tried before war crimes 
set up at Bonn under the sponsorship 
of the Western Powers and all efforts On 06, 19489 de-nazifia- 
for G~~~ unifiation had tion in the Soviet Zone was declared 
unsuccessful. completed by order of the Soviet Oc- 
indusvial in the cupation authorilties. After that day. 
soviet zone 8 per had formerly only war criminals and criminal ele- 
beloneed to Nyis Or War criminals ments of the Nazi parq wm tried 
or had been engagd in manufacture before special tribunals. Since then, 
war materials. =hest were several amnesties have been declared 
h a t e d  without compensation by the for former Nari party membem and 
soviet authoritia. =his 8 per rmt minor Nazi and Wehrmacht offi~ials, 
of East German industry employed 30 On the that demrraac~ has 
pa mt of the industrial workers and beem strengthened suffiumtl~ to render 
employees and accounted for qo per them hamless* 
a n t  of gross production. Of these m- 
terprises 3,080 were converted into h d  &?form 
People's Owned Industries. Two hun- 
dred othm, formerly administered by 6,350 landed estates of more than 
M e t  authorities as part of repara- n5o acres were confiscated without 
tion payment, have all been returned compensation-the so-called Junker es- 
to the German people without corn- tates. The more than 5,500,000 acres 
pensation to the USSR and become gained were distributed to farm la- 
58 
borcm, landless pasants, cmant farm- 
era, small farmers and immigrants. In 
this manner 385,000 new farms were 
created, offering homes and livelihood 
to mare ,than t million men, wom- 
en and children. 
The Government 
When tbe GDR was founded, the 
government was formed with partici- 
pation of the anti-fascist bloc of po- 
litical parties and organizations like 
the Free Carmn Trade Union Fed- 
eration, the German Womcn's League 
The p d c s  of the National Front 
on: ~&alist Unity Party (merger 
of the former W a l  Democratic and 
, Communist parties); Christian Demo- 
. crats; Liberal Democrats; National 
Democrats and Peasants' Party. 
Leading members of the government 
me: President, Wilhelan Pieck, Social- 
ist Unity Party (SED), fanner joiner 
and carpenter; Prime Minister Otto 
Grotcwohl (SED), former leading So- 
cial Democrat, printer by trade; Dep- 
uity Prime Minister, Otto Nuschke, 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). 
March 29, the USSR ended its occu- 
pation and declared the German Dem- 
I 
ocratic Republic a Sovereign State. 
I Ekc~*tmr in $he GDR On October 15, 1950, the first elec- , tions were held in *the GDR. They 
were based on the constitution of the 
muntry, which provides that war 
propaganda, every kind of incitement 
against democratic organizations or of- 
ficials, incitement to race-hatred, na- 
tional chauvinism and religious intol- 
erance are considered criminal offenses. 
Equally any action violating the equal 
rights d the citizen is regarded as a 
criminal offense. People convicted of 
such crimes forfeit their right to vote 
! and cannot run for office. 
The National Front, a federation of I all political parties and people's or- 
; ganizations, ran a joint slate of can- 
didates who would accept the National 
Front's program for a united, demo- 
cratic and peaceful Germany. 
The candidates were chosen in fac- 
tories and villages, in city blocks, co- 
operatives and all other basic organi- 
zations of society. The candidates 
were subjected to close scrutiny by their 
electorate and had to give a satis- 
factory account of their activities and 
qualifications at numerous factory, or- 
ganiza tion, community and village 
meetings before their noanination was 
con6rmed. 
94 per a n t  of the eligible voters 
participated in the elections. 34,060 
voters o p p d  the slate of the Na- 
tional Front. 
Living Standards 
OWal Get.man statistics show that 
the cost of living has fallen nearly 
one-third since 1950. The Economic 
Plan for 1954 provides another 5 per 
cent wage increase and further price 
cuts. Production of heavy industry is 
scheduled to rise about 7 per cent; 
consumers' goods production, 23 per 
cent. There is no unemployment. 
National expenditure on public 
health increased from 5,800 million 
marks in 1951 to 8,200 million marks 
in 1955 and is still rising. The Five- 
Year Plan, to be completed in 1955, 
calls for the erection of at least 040,- 
ooo dwellings and the speedy repair 
of war damaged buildings. For 1954. 
the sum of 764 million marks will be 
provided from state funds for hous- 
ing. One-third of the 1953 state bud- 
get of the GDR was devoted to cul- 
tural, social and health services. 
A. Conditions in the GDR 
Prior to June 1953 a certain justified 
dissatisfaction grew in the GDR, par- 
ticularly among peasants and members 
of the middle class, but also among 
workers. This dissatisfaction was based 
on the government's attempt to de- 
velop heavy industry at  the expense 
of consumer industries and to hasten 
completion of the Five-Year Plan at 
the expense of the peasantry and the 
middle classes. 
On June I 1, the Government of the 
GDR issued a number d decrees to 
amend this situation, including ap- 
proval of state credits for private en- 
terprise, and easing the tax burden 
on peasants and small business. 
The government also declared an 
amnesty for prisoners convicted of 
minor violations of People's Owned 
property and guaranteed the return of 
all their property to peasants and mal l  
business men who had fled to the west 
because of high taxes. The peasants 
were granted credits and other aid. 
The people of the GDR showed 
great satisfaction over the promises 
for improvements of the living stand- 
ards. The steps of the government of 
the GDR also evoked a lively response 
in Westan Germany, where large cir- 
cles felt that these improvements would 
make unification of Germany easier. 
B. Shution in West Germany 
rhese events occurred at a time 
when West Germany prepared for the 
September elections, in which Aden- 
auer's re-election and Gemany's ad- 
herence to the European Defense Corn- 
munity were at stake. 
On June 16th building workers 
demonstrated in Berlin (eastern sec- 
tor) against a p r o p e d  lo per cent 
Increase in production norms. A few 
hours after the demonstration had 
rtarted, the government rescinded the 
order. In spite of that the riots 
started a few hours later. They were 
marked by infiltration of demonstrators 
from West Berlin, destruction of pub- 
lic and People's Owned property, burn- 
ing of Soviet flags, murderous attacks 
on officials of the Socialist Unity 
Party and kidnaping of East German 
personalities to West Berlin. 
The unrest in Berlin and other 
parts d the GDR, where i t  had been )r 
unleashed simultantously, were soon 
brought under control by #the p a  1 
pleh police and the Soviet occupation 
aUthori ties. I 
Everything pointed to the fact that, I 
taking advantage of the original dem- ! 
onstration, the riots were instigated 
by foreign sabateurs and intervention- 
ists. 
That such an uprising had bem 
long in the making and carefully pre- 
pared had been apparent from a num- 
ber of cases where activities of agents 
acting on behalf of the West had been 
discovered in the GDR. The most note- 
worthy of these cases was that of the 
former Foreign Minister of the GDR, 
Georg Dertinger, who, on Jan. 16, 
1955 had been arrested on charges of 
espionage for "imperialist espionage 
agencies." 
The West German group in charge 
of these sabotage activities "behind 
!the iron curtain" was the Eastern 
Bureau of the Christian Democratic 
Union with otlices in West Berlin. 
There is a wealth of material indicat- 
ing the outside sources of the financing 
and enmuragement for these sabotage 
activities. 
"Many Western observers hem be- 
lieve," New York Times oompondent 
Walter Sullivan reported on June q r d ,  
"that the United Shtes propaganda 
stntion in Berlin, RIM, played a vital 
role in the events of the last week. 
Some even go so far as to say that the 
uprising would never have taken place 
but #for this station's broadcasts which 
both built up the spirit that precipi- 
tated the strikes and likewise, from 
5 a.m. Wednesday, broadcast to all 
parts of Germany details of plans for a 
general strike." 
Alexander Werth in the Nation, July 
I 7 ,  1953, charged the "League of Ger- 
man Youth and other trouble makers" 
with "staging the Berlin riots." This 
League, the Bund Deutscher Jugend 
(BD J ) ,  was exposed in October, 1952, 
by the Prime Minister of Hesse, in 
West Germany, as a murder-terror 
gang, which had received financial 
: b, 
: grants .from US. sourccs, and had 
, marked many Social D m a b  and 
anti-Communists who opposed Bonn 
policies, for assassination. 
"X-Day" had been frequently re- 
ferred to in the West German press as 
the day for the "liberation" of Eastern 
Genmany. Jakob Kaiser, Bonn Minister 
for Internal Affairs, a ministry used as 
a center for espionage and sabotage 
I 
against Pmt Gumany, A r k d  with 
nco-Nazis to recover East German 
holdings. According ,to the French 
Tribune des Nations, June 06, 1954, 
Kaiser had arrived on June 18 in the 
U.S. sector of Berlin, and late in the 
day on June 17 boasted to newsmen 
that the "movement" in East Germany 
that day was led by "former Wehr- 
mach~t &am." 
Glossary of Terms 
Data on various treaties and plans referred 
to frequently during the Berlin discussions. 
(Also commonly refewed to as the 
North Atlantic Pact, North Atlantic 
Alliance) 
A twenty-year treaty signed in Wash- 
ington, April 4, 1949, by the United 
States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, De!nanark, Bel- 
gium, Luxembourg, Portugal, France, 
Italy, and subsequently by Greece and 
Turkey. Went into effect in July, 1949. 
The signatories agreed that an at- 
tack against one is to be considered an 
attack against all, and to give collec- 
tive armed aid to the one attacked. 
The signatories also agreed on a pol- 
icy of intervention in internal affiirs 
under Article 4 whiah provides for 
consultation on action to be taken 
"when in the opinion of any one of 
rhem, the territorial integrity, politi- 
cal independence or security of any of 
the Parties is threatened," thus open- 
ing the way for the use of the pact as 
an instrument to put down internal 
movements of the people, which could 
be extended even to a peaceful change 
by democratic process. 
Called a "defensive alliance," the 
treaty is universally recognized as a 
military alliance directed against the 
USSR. US. Senators who opposed its 
ratification pointed out the grave con- 
stitutional issues raised by the auto- 
matic commitment for the United 
States to go to war, without the con- 
sent of Congress. 
The Wall Street Journal, in an edi- 
torial on April 5, 1949, declaring that 
the Atlantic Treaty nullified the prin- 
ciple of the United Nations, called the 
signing of the pact "the triumph of 
jungle law over international coopera- 
tion on a world scale" and "a substitu- 
tion of brute force for the human qual- 
ity of reason." 
In addition to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, the US. system of military al- 
liances directed against the USSR, in- 
cludes the Rio Pact, with 38 Latin 
American countries, the ANZUS Pact 
~ t t h  Australia and New Zealand, the 
Phillippine Pact, the Japanese Pact, 
the Korean Pact (with the Syngman 
Rhee Government of South Korea), the 
Military Aid Pact with Franm Spain, 
the US.-Pakistan Military Aid Pact, 
and the US.-backed Turkey-Pakistan 
Military Aid Pact, the latter two en- 
visaged as part of a Middle Eastern 
Chain of military alliances to link up 
with the Far Eastern chain anchored 
in Japan. These pacts, in addition to 
military aid, provide for an ever-grow- 
ing chain of US. military and air b e a  
surrounding the Soviet Union. 
NATO-Nortih A h &  on a divided ~ermany and the rearm- 
Treaty Organization ing of its Western section, in complete contravention of the Potsdam agrte- 
The military organization estab- 
lished to implement 'the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty, consisting of a Supreme 
Council of high level representatives of 
the nations concerned and an elaborate 
network of bodies for military prep- 
arations under overall United States 
command. In July, rgqg, the U.S. Con- 
gress passed the Mutual Defense As- 
sistance Act making military aid avail- 
able to Atlantic Treaty countries. 
In 1950, General Dwight Eisenhow- 
er was appointed Supreme Commander 
of the NATO integrated force supplied 
by nations outside and inside of con- 
tinental Europe, including the United 
States, and established Supreme Head- 
quarters of the Allied Powers in Eu- 
rope near Paris. Present Supreme 
Commander is General Alfred M. 
Gruencher. 
On March 8, 1954, it was announced 
that the United States had contributed 
$6poopoo,txm to NATO, while Euro- 
pean nations have also contributed 
large sums. 
US. funds have gone for guns, aan- 
munition, troop equipment, naval ves- 
sels, aircraft including anodern jets, 
atomic weapons, and upwards of loo 
U.S. air and military bases in Europe 
and North Africa. While original goals 
are still far from realization, active 
NATO divisions are now placed at 42. 
Bonn Agrecment 
The Contractual Agreement signed 
by the United States, Great Britain and 
France with the German Federal Re- 
public at Bonn, Germany, May 06, 
1950. In concluding this agreement, 
replacing  the Occupation Statute, the 
three Western Powers, rejecting the 
repeated proposals of the Soviet Union 
for a Four-Power agreement on a peace 
treaty and German unification, in ef- 
fect signed a separate peace treaty with 
the German Federal Republic. In so 
doing, they put the stamp of approval 
ment for a peace treaty with ~ & n y  
and the nations that fought against it 
in World War I1 and the setting up 
of a unified, peaceful German state. 
While the agreement, would techni- 
cally end the $formal occupation of 
Germany by foreign troops, it in fact 
extends that occupation for the period 
of the treaty by arranging for the con- 
tinued presence of the troops of the 
United States, Great Britain and 
France and foreign military bases 
on German soil, simply changing the 
designation from "occupation" to "de- 
fense" forces. The treaty provided 
for heavy payments on the part of 
the German Federal Republic for the 
support of these laces. 
While in words the treaty gives 
to the Federal Republic "full authority 
over external and internal affairs," 
it in fact denies that sovereignty, and 
places Western Germany in the posi- 
tion of a colony by the continued 
presence of foreign troop with com- 
plete freedom of action and maneu- 
vers, and by giving the Western Pow- 
ers the right to interfere in its affaim 
at any time through a clause empow- 
ering them "(to declare a state of ema- 
gency over all or part of the Federal 
territory" when they might decide cir- 
cumstances required such action. 
The Bonn Agreement provides for 
the rearming of West Germany and its 
integration into the European De- 
fense Community set up in a separate 
treaty, but considered, with it, as "a 
single treaty complex," and hence does 
not go into effect until ratification of 
the European Defense Community by 
the six nations included in the latter. 
The European Defense Community 
Treaty (EDC) aigned in Paris May n7, 
1950, by France, the German Federal 
Repu,blic, Italy, Belgium, the Nether- 
lands and Luxembourg. 
* - i Community 1 ~lrr.~! 
This is the plan devised to meet 
the objections against bringing a re- 
amed Western Germany directly into 
NATO, by setting up a common inte- 
grated European army of France, the 
German Federal Republic, Italy, Bel- 
gium, the Netherlands and Luxem- 
bourg, to opemte under the North At- 
lantic Treaty Coanarand. 
The plan provides for 18 German 
divisions which will be commanded 
by the Geman generals who gained 
their battle experience under Hi tler, 
and will join the unified staff o.£ the 
European army. It pmvides for a com- 
mon budget, common armament pro- 
duction, mobilization plans, draftees 
with an active service period of 18 
months, and volunteers. On ratifica- 
tion of EDC, Allied control of Wcst 
German armaments production will 
be lifted. 
The United States and Great Britain 
are not t!hamelves parties to the 
European Defense Community Treaty, 
but they presided over i& signing, 
and signed a separate declaration that 
the United States and Britain would 
regard any threat to the integrity and 
unity of EDC as a threat to their own 
security and would station on the con- 
tinent of Europe "such forces as they 
deem necessary and appropriate to 
contribute to the joint defense of the 
North Atlantic Area." 
The military provisions of EDC are 
to ,be subject to the orders and control 
of the Supreme Commander of NATO. 
They are, in other words, to be the 
forces which an American gemera1 
already commands in Europe, plus a 
large German army, which is to have 
quality of status with ofher armies, 
but would inevitably assume a domi- 
nating role. (There has already been 
talk in Western Germany of expand- 
ing the I n  divisions provided for up 
to st5 or even 60.) 
EDC cannot became effective until 
the Paris Treaty has been ratified by 
all six Ggnatory nations. Strong op- 
position among #the go- b- 
wlved and the people of aU Europe 
has prevented zhis in the two years 
since its signing. On January so, 
1954, Holland became the first gov- 
ernment to clompkte the ratification 
process. Ratification by the Wcst Ger- 
man Parliament on Mar& 8, 1953 could 
not become e k t i v e  without an 
amendment to the constitution, which 
prohibits rearmament and conscrip- 
tion. An amendment permitting the 
latter was rushed through the Bunde- 
stag (Lower House) by Chancellor 
Adenaua following the Berlin Con- 
ference, over the opposition of the 
Social Democratic members. On March 
IP, 1954, the Belgian Parliament ccnn- 
plated ratification. However, Belgium's 
Constitution will have to be changed 
to make it compatible with EDC rc- 
quirements delimiting national sova- 
eignty over armed forces. 
This is the plan for merging Wcst- 
ern Europe's coal and steel production 
under a common authority, signed 
early in 1951 by France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy and 
the West German Government and 
ratified by all six in 195s. Great Brit- 
ain so far has refused to join. The 
plan, intended to form the economic 
basis for EDC, means the rebuilding 
of the Ruhr coal and steel industries 
at the expense of the rest of Europe. 
Under i t  a European steel cartel has 
already started operations, despite lip 
m i c e  given in the plan to the 
breaking up of monopolistic arrange- 
ments. (Schuman Plan also re£erred 
to as the European Coal and Steel 
Communi ty-ECSC), 
This is lhhe plan for the h h a l  
unification of Western Europe undcr 
a multilateral treaty of Western Euro- 
pean states signed in 1950 setting up 
a ~q-nation Coundl of Europe. Little 
progress has been made .toward fed- 
eration due .to the unwillingncm of and the creation of a ConMIidn army 
the countries involved to yield their under EDC, which are envisaged as 
sovereignty. The main emphasis has stepping stones toward the creation 
been on the building up of a commu- of a more inclusive ,political and ew- 
nity of heavy industry by the six na- nomic federation of Western European 
tions involved in the Schuman Plan nations. 
A Chinese Quaker Speaks ... 
In connection with lthe remark of 
Secretary of State Dull-  that "our 
moral sense" forbids diploanatic rela- 
tions with the Chinese People's Re- 
public," we quote from a spetch, 
"Christians in the New China," de- 
livered before the Christian Peace 
Group in London, March t6, 1958, 
by Liao Hung Ying. Mr. Liao was 
educated in English and American 
missionary schools in China, then at 
Oxford, and had many years' expcri- 
a c e  in religious work in China, with 
the Quakers and the YMCA. He was 
invited by the British Quakers to at- 
tend a Friends' World Conference in 
England. Here are a few extracts: 
"Under the People's Oomment  
the Chinese people are making such 
rapid progress in ewry aspect of ,the 
national life that the whole situation 
is dynamic and not static. . . . 
"The relationship between the Peo- 
ple's Government and the Christians 
(and adherents of all other religious 
faiths as well) is an example of the 
growth in quality and quantity. Not 
only is the support for tihe Govmmcnt 
becoming more widespread; it is also 
far deeper and stronger than ever 
before. . . . The ordinary Christians 
gradually saw that the Government's 
policy was for M o m  of religious 
belief. 
"In the past the majority of Chris- 
, ,, tians were apart from the society in 
which they lived. . . . The Chinese ' #M Christians are gradually gaining self- 
confidence and assuming new dignity 
as Christian citizens of their coun- 
try. . . . Indeed rhe feeling of libera- 
tion and the feeling of solidarity in 
support of the Central People's Gov- 
ernment have got to be seen to be 
believed. . . . 
"Thousands of square miles of 
desert land are being made produc- 
tive. . . . Factories, railways, schools, 
hospitals, health centers, houses and 
rest homes for the workers, nursery 
schools and kindergartens, etc., are 
being built by the thousands up and 
down the country. . . . People every- 
where are getting education. Village 
peasants are at tending schools. Beg- 
gars and loafers and prostitutes are 
learning useful trades and regaining 
their self-respect. . . . Women are no 
longer sold as s law or concubines or 
prostitutes; they are becoming judges, 
mayors, engineers, trade union work- 
ers, etc. . . . Yes, the real situation 
is breath-taking. . . . 
"All this means that the Chinese 
people believe in a great and bright 
future; they are determined that their 
children and all future generations 
shall have i n c r ~ ~ n g l y  better material 
conditions, better educational and cul- 
tural opportunities -for the full de- 
velopment of their ,personalities. . . . 
"It means that the Chinese people 
have already started to build for so- 
cialism. . . . This means that the 
Chinese people must have peace to 
build, and build and build. This 
alone is the most powerful guarantee 
of peace. Building for socialism and 
planning for war are contradictory 
in terans. . . . 
"The Central People's Govern- 
ment is the first People's goverllnlent 
we have ever had in our whole histor? 
of thrce or four thousand years. It 
s our owrt government and for it 
we expect moral support and under- 
standing sympathy from our fellow 
Christians in the \Vest. . . . 
"The Chinese Christians completely 
support our government. This sup- 
port is not given blindly, but with 
t~nderstanding and enthusiasm, after 
study of the principles which influ- 
enced the revolution and on ~ h i c h  
our  Government is based. . . . I n  
our study of Marxis111 we find that 
and that the cetltral truth of our re- 
ligion, the Fatherhood of God and 
the Brotherhood of Man, has a new 
meaning and reality to us. . . . 
"The revolution in China restored 
the dignity of lnan to the peasants 
311~1 workers ant1 other social outcasts 
\tho constitltted 85 per cent of China's 
~>upiilation of nearly 5m,m,ooo. IE 
this is not part of the work of estab- 
lishing the Kingdom of God on earth, 
then nothing else is. . . . Most na- 
ttirnll) we feel jo)ful that now a t  least 
S5 per cent of our colllpatriots are no 
longer lleasts of burden hut free men 
and \i.omen.'' 
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